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THE MORAL VIGILANTE AND HER 
COUSINS IN THE SHADOWS 
Paul H. Robinson* 
By definition, vigilantes cannot be legally justified—if they satis-
fied a justification defense, for example, they would not be law-
breakers—but they may well be morally justified, if their aim is to 
provide the order and justice that the criminal justice system has failed 
to provide in a breach of the social contract. Yet, even moral vigilan-
tism is detrimental to society and ought to be avoided, ideally not by 
prosecuting moral vigilantism but by avoiding the creation of situa-
tions that would call for it. Unfortunately, the U.S. criminal justice 
system has adopted a wide range of criminal law rules and procedures 
that regularly and intentionally produce gross failures of justice. 
These doctrines of disillusionment may provoke vigilante acts, 
but not in numbers that make it a serious practical problem. More 
damaging is their tendency to provoke what might be called “shadow 
vigilantism,” in which civilians and officials feel morally justified in 
manipulating or subverting the criminal justice system to compel the 
system to deliver the justice that it appears reluctant to impose. Unfor-
tunately, shadow vigilantism can be widespread and impossible to ef-
fectively prosecute, leaving the system’s justness seriously distorted. 
This, in turn, can provoke a damaging antisystem response, as in the 
“Stop Snitching” movement, that further degrades the system’s repu-
tation for doing justice, producing a downward spiral of lost credibil-
ity and deference. We would all be better off—citizens and offenders 
alike—if this dirty war had never started. 
What is needed is a reexamination of all of the doctrines of disil-
lusionment, with an eye toward reformulating them to promote the in-
terests they protect in ways that avoid gross failures of justice. 
  
                                                                                                                                      
 *  Colin S. Diver Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. The author wishes to thank 
Sarah Robinson, James Lee, and John Sullivan for their excellent research assistance, and David Ru-
dovsky, Ilya Rudyak, and the participants of faculty workshops at Utah, Columbia, Case Western Re-
serve, and University of Pennsylvania for useful comments and suggestions. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
There are many good reasons for a criminal justice system to be de-
voted to doing justice. (“Doing justice” is meant here in its dictionary 
sense of giving an offender the punishment deserved1). Many people see 
doing justice as a deontological value in itself, but it also has a practical 
value. As a wide variety of writers have observed, and as I have docu-
mented elsewhere, there is good reason to believe that a commitment to 
doing justice, and avoiding injustice, has important utilitarian crime-
control benefits.2 
A criminal justice system that fails to do justice, to earn “moral 
credibility” with the community it governs, can undermine its effective-
                                                                                                                                      
 1. Justice: “reward or penalty as deserved; just deserts.” WEBSTER NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 
OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE 795 (David B. Guralink et al. eds., coll. ed. 1962). In determining “just 
deserts,” it is not only moral philosophers, but also lay people, who are good at distinguishing among 
cases according to their relative moral blameworthiness. Paul H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban, Con-
cordance and Conflict in Intuitions of Justice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1829, 1846–80 (2007). While some fac-
tors are culturally dependent, there are many on which there is enormous agreement across all de-
mographics, especially those relating to the core of criminality: physical aggression and taking without 
consent. Id. at 1876–80. People may disagree about the general level of severity within a punishment 
system—a disagreement that for decades masked the existence of the high agreement on relative 
blameworthiness—but such judgments about general severity are malleable, while shared judgments 
of relative blameworthiness may not be. Paul H. Robinson et al., Realism, Punishment & Reform, 77 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1611, 1623–26 (2010). 
 2. The diversity of writers who have made these points includes James Fitzjames Stephen,  
Jeremy Bentham, Johannes Andenaes, Franklin Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, James Q. Wilson & 
Richard J. Herrnstein, Henry M. Hart, Jr., Herbert L. Packer, the U.S. Supreme Court, and the draft-
ers of the ALI’s Model Penal Code. See the authorities collected at Paul H. Robinson et al., Empirical 
Desert, Individual Prevention, and Limiting Retributivism: A Reply, 17 New Crim. L. Rev. 312, 315–19, 
326 (2014) [hereinafter Robinson et al., Empirical Desert]. For a discussion of the empirical evidence 
in support of these effects, see PAUL H. ROBINSON, INTUITIONS OF JUSTICE AND THE UTILITY OF 
DESERT 141–238 (2013) [hereinafter ROBINSON, INTUITIONS OF JUSTICE]. 
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ness in a variety of ways: (1) it can cause people to resist and subvert the 
operation of the criminal justice system; (2) it can short-circuit the crimi-
nal law’s ability to stigmatize, an inexpensive yet powerful means of in-
fluencing people’s conduct; (3) it can undermine the criminal law’s ability 
to get compliance in grey-area cases where the condemnable nature of 
the prohibited conduct seems unsettled or ambiguous (think download-
ing music, insider-trading); and, perhaps most importantly, (4) it can un-
dermine criminal law’s role in shaping societal norms (think domestic vi-
olence, drunk driving, and date rape). In contrast, a criminal law that 
earns a reputation for doing justice and avoiding injustice—that earns 
moral credibility with its community—is one that can harness these 
sources of influence. 
One final mechanism by which a system’s earned moral credibility 
can promote effective crime control is its ability to avoid vigilantism. This 
source of influence is unique, however, in that it is asymmetrical: while 
the other mechanisms of influence gain power from avoiding both injus-
tice and failures of justice, avoiding vigilantism depends only on the lat-
ter. This Article examines this vigilante dynamic and finds that its opera-
tion is also unique, and quite complicated. Failures of justice can provoke 
classic vigilantism—people going into the streets to impose the deserved 
punishment that the criminal justice system has failed to impose—but 
such classic vigilantism is not, as a practical matter, a serious problem in 
itself. The relatively low frequency of such conduct and the system’s abil-
ity to effectively respond with punishment suggests the problem is at 
most symbolic. 
There is, however, real danger in what might be called “shadow 
vigilantism,” in which both civilians and officials disillusioned by the 
criminal justice system’s apparently intentional failures of justice feel 
morally justified in manipulating or subverting the system to compel the 
justice that the system seems reluctant to impose. Shadow vigilantism is 
more dangerous than the classic sort both because it can be pervasive 
and because the system has no effective means of countering it. A further 
source of damage comes in the predictable reaction to its common ten-
dency to do injustice, which can then further undermine the system’s 
reputation and its crime-control effectiveness in a downward spiral to 
greater tragedy. 
Some failures of justice are unavoidable, and are easily understood 
and forgiven by the community. For example, people are likely to appre-
ciate the natural limits on accurately reconstructing past events and the 
importance of being sure, beyond a reasonable doubt, about a defend-
ant’s guilt before imposing punishment. Failures for these reasons are 
likely to be accepted as a necessary price for avoiding injustice and 
wrongful convictions. 
However, as Part IV details, the criminal justice system has adopted 
a wide range of rules and practices that it knows in advance will produce 
gross failures of justice where guilt is clear and where the offense is seri-
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ous. Such doctrines will indeed undermine the system’s moral credibility 
with the community. These failure-of-justice doctrines often have a  
rational basis—the criminal justice system promotes more values than 
just doing justice. Fairness in adjudication is a central concern, as are a 
variety of other interests, such as protecting privacy, limiting governmen-
tal intrusion in citizens’ lives, and maintaining a proper separation of 
powers. But when these interests are advanced through mechanisms that 
let offenders who are clearly guilty of serious crimes go free, there is a 
cost of such failures of justice, both deontological and utilitarian—the 
failure to give deserved punishment and the lost crime-control effective-
ness that flows from the system’s lost credibility. These costs encourage 
society to seek a system that promotes its legitimate interests in ways that 
avoid or minimize the moral credibility costs of failures of justice. 
No system can satisfy both ends of the spectrum by earning a per-
fect reputation for giving deserved punishment in all cases, and avoiding 
miscarriage of justice by inflicting undeserved punishment. The better 
the criminal justice system’s reputation for doing justice, and for avoiding 
injustice, the stronger its moral credibility will be with the community it 
governs. The greater the criminal justice system’s reputation for promot-
ing these ideals, the more powerful its ability to affect people’s conduct 
and their internalization of norms through the mechanisms of social in-
fluence described above will be, including avoiding vigilantism. 
Among the law-abiding, vigilantism has a bad name, but probably 
for the wrong reason. Vigilantism is not always the KKK perpetrating a 
racist lynching in the dark of night. In many instances, vigilantism may be 
morally defensible, perhaps even morally demanded: Part II illustrates 
such instances. On the other hand, even moral vigilantism creates its own 
societal problems, which means it should be avoided where possible, as 
Part III explains. But that does not mean that the moral vigilantes must 
simply suffer in silence. Rather, it means that society has a moral obliga-
tion to hold up its end of the social contract so that its citizens are never 
put in the position of having to be a moral vigilante. Parts IV and V illus-
trate the complexity of fulfilling this obligation, and the potential damage 
to a society that fails to do so. 
II. THE MORAL VIGILANTE 
One of the earliest developments in civilized society is giving a gov-
erning entity a monopoly on violence by shifting punishment and protec-
tion duties from the individual victim or her group to the larger society, 
making justice and crime-control a governmental rather than an individ-
ual or small-group function. The shift is evident not only in practical re-
forms—the establishment of government-run police, courts, and correc-
tions—but also in the symbolism enshrined in those institutions. Criminal 
cases are formally brought by “The People” or “The State,” rather than 
the victim. Criminal trials are typically required to be public. In the  
United States, criminal liability is to be decided by lay juries representing 
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the general population, both literally and symbolically. That symbolism 
helps advertise the societal nature of criminal judgments, which gives 
them a legitimacy, and thereby, an influence, that they would not other-
wise have. 
Indeed, it is this special characteristic of criminal law that is at the 
heart of the criminal-civil distinction. Criminal liability rests not so much 
on the fact that the offender has violated the victim’s interest—civil lia-
bility could deal with that—but vindicates instead the violation of a soci-
ety’s shared norms. Indeed, many criminal offenses have little or no tort 
liability counterpart because they vindicate societal interests: counterfeit-
ing is criminalized to protect the society’s financial system; official brib-
ery is criminalized to protect its political system; and bigamy is criminal-
ized, even if consensual, to protect the institution of the family. Criminal 
law holds a special role in expressing societal values and vindicating soci-
etal wrongs and, to do this effectively, criminal liability and punishment 
must come from the society itself, not a self-appointed subgroup. 
By shifting the justice and protection functions to the society, how-
ever, the individual does sacrifice her natural right to strike out against 
those that try to victimize her. But it is a fair trade, which is why this so-
cial contract is so universally accepted: A societal system of punishment 
and prevention has access to greater resources and, by virtue of its status, 
carries greater legitimacy, which translates into greater effectiveness 
from which every member of society benefits. 
These virtues of societal justice help explain why vigilantism is 
commonly abhorred, especially in a democratic society. Vigilantism not 
only invites bias and risks lack of restraint, it is also antidemocratic. Its 
self-appointed nature undermines its legitimacy and, thereby, its norma-
tive influence. 
Of course, there are occasions when the individual is thrown back 
into a brief state of nature, where the social contract for justice and pro-
tection can be of no help. For instance, imagine a person tries to kill you 
to get the money in your purse. The government’s criminal justice system 
is nowhere to be seen. If you are to save yourself, you must act on your 
own behalf. Less dramatic forms of the problem can be common in  
everyday life, as when the tiger mother looking for that hard-to-find vid-
eo game grabs it from your hands. You will need to use force against her 
to hang on to it, or to grab it back. 
But the criminal law is not insensitive to the problem. It anticipates 
that sometimes people will have to act on their own, that the police can-
not be everywhere. Indeed, the law typically provides detailed rules that 
describe just what and when a person may do what would otherwise be 
prohibited. Justification defenses, for example, allow use of force against 
unlawful aggressors.3 If it is necessary to protect yourself, you can shoot 
                                                                                                                                      
 3. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 (1962). 
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the robber trying to kill you, or grab the wrist of the person trying to 
steal your video game. 
But even here, the criminal law has a strong preference for having 
the state deal with the problem and to keep its near monopoly on the use 
of force. For example, you may not use force that risks serious bodily in-
jury to the game thief, even if that is necessary to successfully maintain 
possession of the game.4 The law tells you it is better to let the thief have 
it, and hope that the police and courts can sort it out later. Similarly, in 
many states you may not use lethal force against the robber intent on 
killing you if you can retreat in safety.5 Nor can you ever act in anticipa-
tion of an attack that you know is coming; you must wait until it comes, 
even if that disadvantages you in your defense.6 In other words, the law 
commonly obliges a victim to sacrifice her own interests to protect the 
interests of the law-breaker if, from the larger societal perspective, this 
avoids a greater harm or evil. 
Some victims will be unhappy with the sacrifices required of them.7 
But the rules can be defended from a societal perspective that takes ac-
count of all parties’ interests, even those of the law-breaker, and reduces 
the overall risk of escalation, even if it means sacrificing the victim’s in-
terests. It is better to defer to the courts, it is argued, even if the chance 
of their success in that instance is remote. 
But what if the system fails to uphold its end of the social contract in 
more serious ways? What if the system’s policies and practices let crime 
become a serious problem in the lives of citizens and it does not respond 
to popular pleadings? What if it lets crime become a serious problem for 
some minority of society but not others? What if the system, having ac-
quired its near-monopoly on the use of force, simply becomes indifferent 
to citizen’s judgments that doing justice and fighting crime are im-
portant? Obviously even in such a situation, law remains intact, and it is 
still illegal for an individual to do anything beyond the strict rules of jus-
tification defenses. But, would it be so clearly immoral to ignore the legal 
limits in such a situation? Is there such a thing as a moral vigilante? If so, 
what rules would define how such a person could stay within the moral 
realm? 
Section A offers a series of case studies in which the social contract 
seems to have been broken and in which the vigilante action seems quite 
understandable, perhaps even morally justified. Section B, inspired by 
these examples, offers ten rules that one might suggest to a person or 
                                                                                                                                      
 4. E.g., id. §§ 3.06(1)(a) & (3)(d), 3.11(2). 
 5. E.g., id. § 3.04(2)(b)(ii); Robinson et al., The American Criminal Code: General Defenses 
(Univ. of Pa. Law School Faculty Scholarship, Paper 1425, 2014), available at http://scholarship. 
law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1425 (collecting authorities). 
 6. The use of defensive force until the threat is imminent, under the common law formulation, 
or the use of such force is “immediately necessary,” under the formulation of Model Penal Code 
(“MPC”) § 3.04(1). See PAUL H. ROBINSON & MICHAEL CAHILL, CRIMINAL LAW 512 (3d ed. 2011). 
 7. The growing popularity of the “stand your ground” rule, which creates an exception in some 
situations to the MPC rule requiring retreat before use of deadly force, probably reflects such unhap-
piness. Id. at 331–32. 
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group contemplating moral vigilantism. If these rules are satisfied, at 
least in spirit, if not in rigid detail, a group might have grounds to con- 
sider themselves morally justified, even if not legally so. 
A. Filling a Breach of the Social Contract 
Although to many people the classic vision of vigilantes is the Ku 
Klux Klan lynch mob, the term had a different association in its original 
use. In 1851 San Francisco, citizens publicly announced the formation of 
a committee to provide the protection and justice that the corrupt crimi-
nal justice system of their newly created government would not. The 
“Vigilance Committee,” as it called itself—from the Spanish word for 
guard or watchman8—advertised seeking members and published reports 
on what it did and why. 
1. San Francisco Vigilance Committee 
The city of San Francisco was created almost overnight with the dis-
covery of gold in 1848.9 Statehood followed soon after,10 which brought 
elections for offices in the new government. But many of those who ran 
for office had neither local roots nor an interest in the city’s future. The 
transient electorate knew little of the candidates and was often happy to 
trade a vote for a free beer. They elected many rascals and the result was 
a criminal justice system as often in league with the criminal gangs as it 
was fighting them.11 
When the situation became intolerable, citizens were finally 
prompted to form their Vigilance Committee, which arrested and pub-
licly tried offenders.12 The Committee ultimately broke the worst of the 
gangs, “the Hounds,” and ran them out of the city.13 When government 
officials threatened to put some of the Vigilance leaders on trial, hun-
dreds of Committee members came forward insisting that they too must 
be tried.14 The planned prosecutions stalled.15 When new elections 
brought more responsible officials, the Vigilance Committee disbanded 
itself.16 
  
                                                                                                                                      
 8. RAY ABRAHAMS, VIGILANT CITIZENS: VIGILANTISM AND THE STATE 4 (1998). 
 9. See, e.g., ROBERT M. SENKEWICZ, VIGILANTES IN GOLD RUSH SAN FRANCISCO 14 (1985). 
 10. See, e.g., id. at 16. 
 11. See, e.g., MARY FLOYD WILLIAMS, HISTORY OF THE SAN FRANCISCO COMMITTEE OF 
VIGILANCE OF 1851 105, 107, 143–44, 214–19 (1921). 
 12. Id. at 203–04, 212. 
 13. Id. at 107 n.51. 
 14. Id. at 217. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 373. 
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2. Lavender Panthers 
Well-motivated vigilantism exists outside of Wild West history. A 
century after the Vigilance Committee’s battle with an ineffective crimi-
nal justice system, San Francisco was still seeing vigilante action, this 
time by gays being regularly bashed by homophobes as police stood by. 
Three hundred gay harassment cases were logged in 1973 alone, and 
many more than this went unreported to the unsympathetic police.17 
In one typical incident, Reverend Ray Broshears called police when 
young men were harassing people leaving his Helping Hands Gay Com-
munity Service Center.18 The police came but did nothing except tell the 
harassers that it was Broshears who had called them and that it was he 
who planned to file a complaint against them.19 As soon as the police left, 
the young men beat Broshears severely.20 
Broshears was a Pentecostal evangelical minister who raised money 
for gay causes, helped homeless teenagers find shelter, and helped found 
the Gay Alliance.21 He picketed large companies to protest discrimina-
tory hiring practices and helped organize San Francisco’s first Gay Pride 
Parade.22 He had watched the growing power of the Black Panthers in 
nearby Oakland and after his beating he decided that his helping hand 
was not enough.23 What was needed was an organization that would ag-
gressively defend the rights of gays by providing the protection and jus-
tice that the system had shown itself unwilling to do. 
In July 1973, he formed a new activist group that called itself the 
Lavender Panthers.24 Its members did not carry guns, but were trained in 
various martial arts and patrolled areas known for a high incidence of 
gay bashing. Typically, harassers would wait outside a known gay bar, 
and then begin shoving the patrons as they left in order to provoke a re-
sponse that could be used as an excuse to escalate their attack to a full-
scale beating.25 With the advent of the Lavender Panthers, however, the 
pattern changed. In one typical incident, when gay bashers began shoving 
and beating patrons outside the Naked Grape, a well-known gay bar, the 
Lavender Panthers pulled up in their trademark gray Volkswagen bus, 
                                                                                                                                      
 17. The Sexes: The Lavender Panthers, TIME (Oct. 8, 1973) http://www.time.com/time/magazine/ 
article/0,9171,908008,00.html; see also, e.g., Lavender Panthers Patrol SF Streets to Protect Homosexu-
als, LOS ANGELES TIMES, July 8, 1973, at 3; The Purple Gang: San Francisco Gays Turn Vigilante,  
MILWAUKEE JOURNAL, July 10, 1973, at 25, available at http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid= 
1499&dat=19730710&id=jHYfAAAAIBAJ&sjid=xigEAAAAIBAJ&pg=1420,624726; Ivan Sharpe, 
Vigilantes in Lavender, LEADER-POST, July 10, 1973, at 11, available at http://news.google.com/news 
papers?id=onJVAAAAIBAJ&sjid=uTwNAAAAIBAJ&pg=1261%2C1382772. 
 18. The Sexes: The Lavender Panthers, supra note 17. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id.; see also Lavender Panthers Patrol SF Streets to Protect Homosexuals, supra note 17, at 3. 
 22. Lavender Panthers Essay, GOOGLE SITES, https://sites.google.com/site/psabrittanybrock/the-
lavender-panthers (last visited Jan. 9, 2015).  
 23. See The Sexes: The Lavender Panthers, supra note 17. 
 24. See id. 
 25. See id. 
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grabbed pool cues, and began beating the harassers who quickly fled.26 In 
this particular incident, the gay bashers made a tactical error in retreating 
without their car and were forced to return to the bar later to try to nego-
tiate its return. 
Another common strategy of the Lavender Panthers was to tag the 
harassers with red spray paint and use whistles to call attention to their 
harassment.27 Within a year, the right of homosexuals to live openly in 
the community had gained sufficient acceptance, and the incidents of 
harassment had been sufficiently reduced, that the Lavender Panthers 
determined they were no longer needed and voluntarily disbanded their 
group.28 
The Lavender Panthers had probably never heard of the original 
San Francisco Vigilance Committee, but both organizations were 
spawned by a belief that failures of justice could not simply be tolerated, 
that it was sometimes both necessary and moral to take up the task that 
the criminal justice system was refusing to do. The social contract—by 
which citizens give up their right to use force and rely upon the criminal 
justice system for protection and justice—had been breached. Both the 
1851 Vigilance Committee and the 1973 Lavender Panthers saw little 
choice, and complete legitimacy, in taking up their natural right to pro-
tect themselves and to do the justice that the official system had for-
saken. 
These are two examples of vigilante groups that can lay some color-
able claim to moral, if not legal, justification. But, there are a wide  
variety of vigilante groups for which one might have some sympathy and 
understanding. 
3. Deacons for Defense and Justice  
In 1964, the Congress of Racial Equality (“CORE”) planned to 
stage a desegregation campaign in the city of Jonesboro, Louisiana.29 In 
an effort to prevent this, the local branch of the Ku Klux Klan organized 
a motorcade to drive through a black neighborhood in the city.30 The po-
lice participated, and helped cut off power to the neighborhood.31 It was 
in response to this intimidation and others like it that a group of about 
twenty African-American men first formed the Deacons for Defense and 
Justice, an armed paramilitary group, many of whose members were war 
                                                                                                                                      
 26. Id. 
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veterans.32 The group took on tasks of guarding activists, patrolling black 
neighborhoods, and protecting civil rights demonstrations from the Klan, 
and sometimes the police.33 The members of the group did not publicly 
identify themselves for fear of sanctions by officials.34 
In 1965, in nearby Bogalusa, a local black paper mill manager 
named Robert Hicks had two CORE activists staying in his home with 
his family.35 The night the activists arrived, the Bogalusa Police Chief, 
Claxton Knight, came to the house and told Hicks that he should turn 
over the CORE activists so they could be escorted out of town.36 Hicks 
was told that the Klan would pay him a visit if he did not comply.37 
Klansmen also called the house, threatening to firebomb it.38 Hicks called 
friends who later arrived to guard the house.39 The Klan chose not to ap-
pear.40 Three weeks later, in response to the ongoing threat, Hicks joined 
with the leaders of the Jonesboro Deacons to form the first satellite 
branch of the Deacons in Bogalusa.41 In similar fashion, the Deacons 
eventually spread across Mississippi, Alabama, and Louisiana.42 
In another incident, a few weeks after the formation of the Bogalusa 
chapter, Hicks’ wife rescued an activist from his car after it had been sur-
rounded by a group of angry Klansmen, by drawing a pistol and facing 
down the Klansmen.43 Under the cover of night, the Klansmen returned 
and fired upon Hicks’ home.44 But the Deacons had heard this was going 
to happen, and seven members sheltered in the Hick’s home returned 
fire.45 
The Deacons’ activities were at first not well received by some 
Black civil rights groups and activists at the time. The nonviolent Dr. 
Martin Luther King, Jr. denounced their acts of “aggressive violence.”46 
But increasing danger and the group’s effectiveness ultimately convinced 
King to allow the Deacons to accompany him as security for the March 
Against Fear from Memphis to Jackson in 1966.47 The Deacons also pro-
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vided armed security for Charles Evers’ desegregation campaign in 
Natchez, Mississippi.48 
At its height, the Deacons expanded to approximately twenty-one 
chapters.49 Although the Deacons’ willingness to use arms led to investi-
gations by the FBI, that attention faded when other far more aggressive 
organizations such as the Black Panthers arose.50 The Deacons eventually 
ceased operations in 1968, and faded into relative obscurity in the history 
of the civil rights movement.51 
4. Reverend Dempsey’s Operation Confiscation 
Reverend Oberia Dempsey, pastor of Upper Park Avenue Baptist 
Church in Harlem, New York, in 1962, was troubled by the increasing vi-
olence and other human misery associated with growing heroin and nar-
cotics trade in the neighborhood—he believed that Harlem alone had 
40,000 dope addicts.52 He was also troubled by the apparent indifference 
or at least ineffectiveness of the authorities in dealing with the drug 
pushers.53 
He formed the Anti-Crime and Anti-Drug Committee of Harlem, 
based out of his church, and initially focused on advocacy and grassroots 
campaigns, including a 1962 rally of block associations, church groups, 
and other community organizations to protest the official inaction on 
Harlem’s drug problems.54 
Dempsey also organized a campaign called “Operation Interrup-
tion,” to publicize the drug problem through newspaper articles, and to 
engage in such activities as picketing known drug dealer hangouts, bring-
ing police officers to known drug-dealing sites, and opening a rehabilita-
tion center for recovering drug addicts known as the House of Hope.55 
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These activities had limited effect. According to Dempsey, “citizens 
fear to venture out after dark. Church members are afraid to go to their 
meetings at night. The law seems to be in the hands of the muggers and 
robbers. There’s panic among the people.”56 Some merchants began 
keeping baseball bats behind their store counters because of “deep fear 
of robbery or other crimes.”57 
By 1965, Dempsey concluded his group must become more confron-
tational. They organized an armed vigilante patrol, consisting of commu-
nity members and seven former police officers licensed to carry fire-
arms.58 Dempsey himself carried a .32 revolver and became known as the 
“pistol packin’ pastor.”59 The Pastor renamed the patrol “Operation  
Confiscation” escalating its activities in a new initiative consisted of 200 
citizen-patrol members, seeking to “watch for pushers, summon police, 
and where they are not forthcoming immediately, make citizen arrests.”60 
The group harassed suspected dealers and encouraged the people in the 
neighborhood to go after the pushers.61 If citizens had problems with 
pushers and were afraid to go to the police, they should come to him, he 
said, and he would deal with the problem.62 
Dempsey’s efforts were met with somewhat grudging acquiescence 
by the police. In reaction to the news that Dempsey had organized a mili-
tia to prevent drug crime in Harlem, local police said they “would not 
deny Mr. Dempsey’s basic premise,” and conceded that there were not 
enough officers available for crime control purposes.63 As one police of-
ficer stated, “it’s a case of the good guys versus the bad guys . . . and 
without the good guys of the community with us, we can’t make Harlem 
safe.”64 
In 1969, Dempsey organized a petition to New York’s U.S. Attor-
ney Robert Morgenthau warning, “if something isn’t done immediately, 
people are going to protect themselves. There’s going to be a lot of 
bloodshed.”65 Dempsey also advocated for stricter penalties for drug 
dealers, including “death by firing squad” for dope traffickers.66 
By the early 1970s, Dempsey’s efforts had gained national attention; 
he was interviewed by Ebony magazine in 1970, in an article entitled 
“Blacks Declare War on Dope.”67 After being attacked by local drug 
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dealers in 1971, Dempsey encouraged citizens to arm themselves.68 
“[P]eople in Harlem should find the heaviest baseball bats around or any 
other type of weapon that’s sold legally to ward off these hoodlums.”69 
Dempsey’s efforts, and the rising crime problem in New York City, 
ultimately spurred local politicians to action. By 1973, New York was 
shifting away from its prior position using treatment, instead of prosecu-
tion and incarceration, to deal with the city’s drug and drug-related hom-
icide and crime problem. Much harsher drug laws were enacted later 
known as the “Rockefeller drug laws,” mandating severe sentences for 
drug possession.70 Among the communities most supportive of the laws 
was Dempsey’s neighborhood, where Black residents had run out of pa-
tience with the drug problem.71 
5. India’s Gulabi Gang (Pink Gang) of Women Vigilantes 
In 2006, Sampat Pal Devi, a forty-five year old Indian woman, was 
incensed by the misbehavior of her alcoholic brother-in-law, who had 
beaten her sister and dragged her by her hair into the streets of Banda.72 
Located in the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh, Banda City and the greater 
Banda region was plagued by social, political, and economic problems, 
ranging from hunger, poverty, murders, and droughts, to pervasive prob-
lems of corrupt government.73 The region was also known for repressive 
treatment of women and child marriage; it is a region where domestic 
and sexual abuse of women is considered a fact of life, and where people 
of lower castes are poorly treated.74 Fully aware of these realities within 
her community, Devi understood that there was no local power that 
would come to the aid of her sister or any of the women who found 
themselves victims of violence at the hands of local men. As Devi put it, 
“[n]obody comes to our help in these parts. The officials and the police 
are corrupt and anti-poor.”75 Knowing that the law would do nothing to 
help, Devi organized a group of neighborhood women to go after the vic-
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timizing brother-in-law.76 The women chased him down and beat  
him with whatever they had at hand, including metal rods and a child’s 
cricket bat.77 
Tired of seeing the problems around her ignored by corrupt and in-
ept officials, Devi formed a vigilante group called the Gulabi Gang (the 
“Pink Gang”), consisting of women dressed in trademark bright pink sa-
ris.78 The organization would not let wife beaters and rapists go unpun-
ished. They used police batons and bamboo rods to punish offenders that 
the official system would not.79 
In addition to tackling women’s rights issues, the group also began 
confronting local wrongdoers and inept or corrupt local officials and po-
lice.80 The group stormed a police station demanding that officials stop 
selectively enforcing laws because of the complaining victim’s caste, and 
shamed officials for stealing subsidized grain designated for the poor.81 
To support her operations and provide a gathering place for women to 
seek help, Devi opened a small center in her hometown where women 
could come and express their grievances and seek help.82 
The organization soon expanded to approximately 200 members, 
and then experienced explosive growth; membership numbers are now 
reportedly somewhere around 20,000 women, with ten district com-
manders operating in an area of approximately 36,000 square miles.83 The 
group operates a number of outposts modeled on Devi’s operations in 
Banda, providing a meeting place for women just as Devi’s house does.84 
Although strictly a vigilante and activist group when formed in 
2006, the Gulabi Gang eventually entered politics, partially leaving be-
hind the beatings and apolitical stance it became famous for.85 As of 
2011, twenty-one members of the Gulabi Gang have won seats in munic-
ipality-level elections.86 As a result of their newfound political power, the 
group has promoted such projects as construction and repair work of lo-
cal roads, provided access to clean drinking water, and agricultural de-
velopment projects.87 Local village leaders who formerly ignored the con-
cerns of women are now somewhat more receptive.88 Devi, the initial 
founder of the Gulabi Gang, still remains its “commander-in-chief,” defi-
antly stating that “[p]eople have tried to assassinate me, arrest me, abuse 
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me, and shut me up, but I won’t be quiet until things improve for the 
women here.”89 
B. A Vigilante Code 
In the face of the system’s gross insensitivity to the importance of 
doing justice, what are people to do? Is it possible to define what would 
and would not constitute legitimate vigilante action—to define a vigilante 
code that sets the preconditions to and limits of moral action? If a group 
were contemplating vigilante action, here are ten rules one could suggest 
to them so that they can reconsider their plan and stay within more mor-
ally defensible bounds.90  
1. Do not act unless there is a serious failure of justice. Any vigilante 
action will be disruptive. It cannot justify itself unless it produces more 
benefit than the disruption costs. For example, even if the police are lazy 
and indifferent and could solve the problem if they chose to do so, a pat-
tern of petty thefts by youngsters in a market place is not likely to justify 
the social disruption of vigilante action, unless that vigilante action is it-
self of little or no disruption. 
2. Do not act unless there is no lawful way to solve the problem. The 
law allows citizens to use force in defense of unlawful aggression against 
self, others, or property. Stay strictly within the requirements of this le-
gally authorized force if that will provide the needed protection against 
lawlessness. 
3. Do not act alone. The vigilante is one who acts for the community, 
not herself; vengeance is not vigilance. If your conduct is to reflect com-
munity views, that fact must be advertised by having the vigilante action 
be group action. The larger and more broadly-based the group, the bet-
ter. Open membership would be ideal. There may be practical limits on 
how public some discussions can be, but the guiding principles, such as 
the adoption of rules (such as these rules as a charter), ought to be 
sought and approved by as large a group as possible. 
4. Do not cause more harm than is necessary and just, and avoid in-
jury to innocent bystanders. Part of doing justice means recognizing the 
societal interest in minimizing damage to all, even unlawful aggressors. If 
a person’s safety and property can be protected with a punch, it ought 
not be defended with a shot. And, obviously, harm to innocent bystand-
ers ought to be avoided at all costs. 
5. Before acting, be sure of the facts and take full account of all rele-
vant mitigations and excuses. Understand that this is a credibility contest 
with the official criminal justice system. To win the battle for hearts and 
minds, the vigilante must do it better, not worse. The point is to do jus-
tice, and justice requires taking account of the mitigations, as well as the 
aggravations, in a case. A vigilance committee can as easily discredit it-
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self by showing an indifference to mitigations and excuses as the criminal 
justice system disgraces itself by showing indifference to doing justice. 
6. Show restraint and temperance, not arrogance or vindictiveness. 
The goal is to be responsible, even if the government is not. Vigilante 
groups cannot exert themselves as the wrath of God, but just a means of 
shaming the government into doing what it ought to do—take justice se-
riously. A vigilante group must do more than just adhere to the moral-
vigilante rules, it must make it clear that it is adhering. 
7. Give the government warning beforehand that it is in breach of its 
social contract, and give it the opportunity to fix the problem, unless it is 
clear that the warning would be useless. Ideally, this means laying out the 
specifics of the government’s failures of justice and how these failures 
can be avoided, as well as giving the government the time and opportuni-
ty to make things right. It is always preferable to have the official crimi-
nal justice system do justice, no matter how well-respected a vigilance 
committee may be. Admittedly, in some instances, the problem may be 
overwhelmingly obvious to all and a special notification would be sense-
less. 
8. Publicly report afterwards what you have done and why. Failure to 
publicly take responsibility for your actions simply adds to the problem 
of perceived lawlessness. The community cannot judge the justness and 
reasonableness of a vigilance committee’s actions unless it is given the 
details of what has been done and why it needed to be done. 
9. Respect the full society’s norms of what is condemnable conduct. 
Do not act in pursuit of justice for an offense unless it is clear that the 
larger society sees the offender’s conduct as truly condemnable. A pecu-
liar, perverted view of the world lacks the basis for moral vigilante ac-
tion. 
10. If it becomes clear that the problem cannot be fixed through vigi-
lante action, then withdraw from further action. If it becomes clear that 
the criminal justice system literally cannot be changed, then further ac-
tion toward that goal cannot achieve its purpose. Vigilante action must 
be a temporary and transitional state that moves the system to fix itself, 
not a permanent substitute for official conduct. 
If you cannot abide by these rules, do not act. Justice is important and 
it ought to be pursued. But vigilante action that does not take account of 
the preconditions and limitations that morally justify it is doomed to do 
more harm than good to the community and, ultimately, to the cause of 
justice. 
Vigilante action is never legally justified—if it were, by definition it 
would not be vigilante action—but if a group follows these ten rules, it 
might at least be morally justified. 
Certainly, each case in Section A can make a plausible argument 
that the criminal justice system’s failures to do justice morally authorized 
them to engage in conduct that was technically criminal and legally un-
justified. The 1851 San Francisco Vigilance Committee would seem to 
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satisfy most of these ten requirements. Many of the other cases described 
above may satisfy many, if not most of the requirements, although it may 
depend upon the details of each of their specific criminal acts. 
III. SOCIETAL PROBLEMS CAUSED BY VIGILANTISM THAT IS MORALLY 
JUSTIFIED 
As Part II demonstrates, vigilantism cannot only be associated with 
the KKK hiding behind bed sheets for a racially motivated lynching. But 
even moral vigilantism can have negative consequences. In one sense vig-
ilantism is like war: it is never a good thing, but sometimes it is the best 
of bad options. Below are four examples of the kinds of problems that 
can arise in morally-justified vigilante action. 
A. Going Too Far Once Criminal Law’s Bright Line Is Crossed 
Criminal law, properly drafted, offers a bright line for permissible 
conduct—including what is justified in response to criminal conduct un-
deterred by the criminal justice system. But once that line is crossed, 
there are few obvious signposts telling the vigilante not to go a little fur-
ther. Consider three vigilante campaigns each attempting to deal with the 
same problem of drugs and related violence that Reverend Dempsey’s 
Operation Confiscation had some success in dealing with by eventually 
forcing the criminal justice system to take drug dealing more seriously. 
Reverend Dempsey’s struggle with Harlem’s heroin problem in the 
1960s was mirrored in the crack cocaine epidemic in the 1980s. The three 
examples of vigilante responses—from Philadelphia, Detroit, and  
Baltimore—took different paths in addressing the problem. 
1. Mantua Against Drugs (“MAD”) 
The Mantua neighborhood of West Philadelphia was hard hit by the 
crack cocaine epidemic. An economically depressed area—with forty 
percent of its population below the poverty line and one of the worst in-
fant mortality rates in the country—Mantua had an assortment of aban-
doned houses taken over by drug dealers and their customers.91 The 
neighborhood was frustrated by the police’s unwillingness to do anything 
about the open criminality.92 The crackhouses brought not only the usual 
noise and blight, but also increased rates of crime and of neighborhood 
children being drawn into drug abuse.93 
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In 1986, Herman Wrice, an African-American who had run rehabili-
tation programs for addicts in other states, moved back to Philadelphia.94 
There he helped run an inner-city sports league in Mantua.95 When he 
became fed up with the drug dealers’ influence over the neighborhood’s 
youth, he formed Mantua Against Drugs (“MAD”) to confront the drug 
dealers and to drive them out.96 
MAD would picket and harass crackhouses, sometimes by blocking 
entry to customers or by singing and chanting outside the house to em-
barrass those within.97 The drug dealers and demonstrators sometimes 
ended up in shoving matches, which occasionally escalated to brick-
throwing battles.98 MAD also pressured utility companies to cut service 
to the houses to drive the dealers out.99 When the dealers left, MAD 
would board up the houses to prevent reentry.100 The group also went to 
bail hearings for drug dealers, where they would interrupt defense coun-
sels’ presentations in an attempt to intimidate the locally-elected judges 
into setting higher bail.101 
MAD’s efforts seem to have paid off, in part because they even-
tually embarrassed local authorities into taking the drug problem more 
seriously.102 The 1644 felonies in Mantua in 1989 dropped by forty per-
cent by 1993.103 In later work, Wrice trained “street warriors” in over 350 
communities.104 Chants, marches, and vigils are now implemented in 
many neighborhoods around the country using his methods.105 Even the 
Justice Department asked him to serve as a technical consultant on a 
program that helps neighborhoods fight crime.106 
The means used by MAD may fall within the permissible scope of 
the moral vigilante rules and may even be somewhat restrained given the 
frustration of the community. But clearly such confrontations risked spi-
raling into greater violence. The intimidation of judges by MAD mem-
bers is more troubling, however, as there are serious societal risks that 
can come from this sort of interference with legal proceedings. 
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2. Detroit Crackhouse Burnings 
Detroit suffered from the same crack epidemic as Philadelphia, but 
in a somewhat more dangerous form: the drug trade was run by heavily-
armed gangs willing to commit brutal and bloody violent acts to protect 
their trade. The crackhouses brought to the neighborhood not only the 
predictable crime but also common and random gunfire. Chanting and 
singing outside crackhouses probably would not have been an effective 
strategy there. 
Outraged at the failure of authorities to deal with the problem and 
the toll that it took on the neighborhood, two local men, Angelo Parisi, 
an unemployed landscaper, and Perry Kent, an unemployed mechanic, 
took the lead in trying to get police to act to stop the open criminality, 
but with little effect.107 After discussions throughout the neighborhood, 
the two men settled on their own plan: burn the crackhouses down.108 The 
neighborhood took up a collection to buy the canisters of gasoline, which 
Parisi and Kent used to burn down a crackhouse in October 1988.109 
Authorities charged Parisi and Kent with arson, and considered 
pressing conspiracy charges against the neighbors who contributed to the 
fund.110 One local resident began a fund to help pay for the two men’s de-
fense, noting that “[n]inety percent of the people in this block support 
them. When they set the fire, everybody in the neighborhood knew they 
were going to do it and they knew why they were going to do it.”111 Even 
neighbors who did not necessarily approve of the methods used agreed 
that what they did was beneficial, or, at the very least, an understandable 
result of the men’s frustration with the authorities.112 As one neighbor put 
it, “I don’t agree with their means . . . . But I don’t want a crack house in 
my neighborhood. They did what they thought they had to do.”113 At  
trial, despite overwhelming evidence of the men’s guilt, the jury refused 
to convict, acquitting both men of all charges.114 
Not long after this acquittal, crackhouses in other parts of Detroit 
were burned or demolished by neighbors.115 Neighbors stormed other 
crack houses wielding pipes and baseball bats to drive the dealers out. 116 
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Passing motorists honked their horns in celebration, and the crowd of on-
lookers applauded as the dealers ran.117 
Clearly, Detroit’s house-burning approach created greater potential 
for a disaster than did the MAD approach in Philadelphia. But it is pos-
sible that the sufferings and dangers in Detroit may have been worse 
than those in Philadelphia. In the minds of the neighborhood members 
involved, at least, their sufferings justified the risks. 
From the larger societal perspective, it obviously would have been 
better for law enforcement officials, rather than the neighborhood, to 
deal with the crackhouses. An official enforcement action could have 
avoided not only the confrontation risks, but also the subsequent vigil-
ante action by others that the initial act inspired. 
3. Black October and the Off-the-Pusher Movement 
In Baltimore, when authorities did little to fix the endemic drug 
problem, antidealer graffiti appeared on inner-city walls urging people to 
“Off [kill] the pusher,” as the only way to get drugs out of the commu-
nity.118 
On July 13, 1973, a group calling itself “Black October” called a lo-
cal newspaper to tell it that Turk Scott could be found in the basement 
parking lot of his apartment building.119 Scott was a local heroine traf-
ficker who was at the time indicted on eight criminal counts, involving 
the attempt to sell forty pounds of heroin worth millions of dollars.120 Po-
lice found him surrounded by spent shell casings and twenty-five copies 
of a flyer with a warning message for other local dealers: “These Persons 
Are Known Drug Dealers. Selling drugs is an act of treason. The penalty 
for treason is death!! Black October.”121 Scott had been shot more than 
seven times by multiple shooters. 122 
Six days later, George Evans, another local drug dealer with a crim-
inal record for narcotics offenses dating back more than a decade, was 
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shot to death.123 Black October again took responsibility, sending a typed 
statement to the same Baltimore newspaper in which the group claimed 
that it would use any means necessary.124 The letter expressed frustration 
with local police, saying that “[i]t is necessary now, after years of depend-
ing on corrupt police, to solve our own problems by any means necessary 
and available.”125 The letter concluded by again exhorting the public to 
“[o]ff the pushers.”126 In a manifesto presenting, among other things, “10 
Black Laws,” it argued that, given how ineffective the authorities were, 
killings like that of Scott Evans were the only way to solve the drug prob-
lem.127 
After much investigation, the only member of Black October to be 
identified was a young man named Sherman W. Dobson, a college stu-
dent from a Baltimore family.128 He had no criminal record, and had been 
active in the civil rights movement and other community activities.129 
While Dobson awaited trial, the community reaction was surprising given 
the murders that had occurred. Some were happy that someone was do-
ing something to get rid of the heroin dealers. One writer praised Black 
October’s actions: “[i]t is my opinion that ‘Black October’ is doing the 
most beneficial job of combating and eradicating the distribution of 
drugs into the community.”130  
On December 13, 1973, after fourteen hours of deliberation, the ju-
ry deadlocked on the murder charge, settling instead for a compromise 
verdict that held Dobson liable for a taxi hijacking that occurred earlier 
on the night of Scott’s murder, presumably in preparation for the kill-
ing.131 
Baltimore was not alone in this violent response to drug dealing. A 
social worker in Washington, D.C. told the press that the most effective 
solution to the drug problem was “killing the pusher.”132 An apparently 
organized group in New York undertook a campaign of killing drug 
pushers, sometimes by throwing them off building rooftops.133 Ten were 
killed in a period of eighteen months.134 
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Clearly, killing dealers is significantly more criminal then burning 
crack houses. The practice would seem to violate many, if not most, of 
the rules that might morally justify vigilante action. Particularly distress-
ing is the fact that Turk Scott was awaiting trial for drug dealing when he 
was murdered.135 Apparently, those involved had little trust in the court’s 
ability to deal effectively with the problem, even after the large-scale 
dealer had been indicted. 
Taken together, these three cases show how easy it is for moral vigi-
lante action to slide into immoral action. When the morally-defensible 
efforts are ineffective, the next logical step is to do a little more, until 
something does work. If harassing dealers does not work, then burning 
down their place of business is a logical next step. If that does not work, 
pushing them off the roof certainly will. 
B. Legitimizing Law-Breaking and Inspiring Extremists 
Another problematic aspect of even moral vigilantism is its effect in 
legitimizing law-breaking. Once a group takes the law into its own hands, 
especially when the action is seen and accepted by the community as 
morally justified, it creates a dangerous precedent. This precedent makes 
it that much easier for others, perhaps not so devoted to staying within 
moral bounds, to take the law into their hands, too. Indeed, the open ac-
ceptance of law-breaking may inspire others with quite extreme views 
toward vigilante acts that the community would consider as seriously 
condemnable. Consider a few examples. 
1. Project Perverted Justice 
In 2003, a group of computer-savvy volunteers, led by a man adopt-
ing the nom de guerre of Xavier von Erck, formed Perverted Justice in 
the belief that pedophiles were using the expanding web technologies to 
better lure children for abuse.136 Consisting of former abuse victims, re-
tired law enforcement officers, and civilian volunteers, the group would 
find and monitor online chat rooms where pedophiles were trying to 
make connections with teenagers.137 Once they identified a predator 
trolling, the group would embarrass him to his spouse, significant others, 
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employers, or the community by posting his chats with the teenage 
girls.138 More aggressive forms of action included arranging to meet the 
man and filming his embarrassment when they, rather than a young teen, 
appeared for the meeting.139 As of 2014, the group claims to have assisted 
587 chat-based convictions, and claims it has information-sharing agree-
ments with hundreds of local police agencies, as well as the Department 
of Homeland Security.140  
But, by elevating the public’s emotional level of outrage against 
child sex-abuse and showing that individual citizens could be as effective, 
if not more effective than law enforcement, the group may have inspired 
other individuals to immolate their efforts in less justifiable ways. For in-
stance, by legitimizing such citizen conduct, the project also may have in-
spired harassment or abuse of suspected child molesters with little proof 
behind the suspicion. For example, in 2006, Michael Anthony Mullen, in-
censed by a recent case he had heard about, pretended to be an F.B.I. 
agent and arranged to “interview” two sex offenders living together in 
Whatcom County, Washington. 141 When a third roommate left the 
apartment, Mullen shot and killed the two offenders.142 
Whenever a group is very public in drawing attention to a law en-
forcement failure, there are always risks that the attention may inspire 
others to act, and perhaps in a way far beyond what the group would 
support. When a vigilante group acts, the danger is even greater—
because part of the message of vigilante action is to suggest to citizens 
that they really can, and perhaps should, act where the criminal justice 
system has failed. That message makes it that much easier for the ex-
tremist to act by himself. 
Consider two other examples of extremists inspired to vigilante ac-
tion. Operation Rescue, for example, spent years intimidating and inter-
fering with abortion clinics, which they saw as “baby killing mills,” even-
tually prompting Congress to enact the Freedom of Access to Clinic 
Entrances Act (“FACE”) in 1994.143 Their activities are also thought to 
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have inspired Scott Roeder, a donor to the organization, to murder Dr. 
George Tiller in 2009, fatally shooting him in the head while he was at his 
church.144 
Another example is the Animal Liberation Front (“ALF”), which 
uses violence against institutions that use animals in research, railing 
against “speciesism,” defined by one activist as “the belief that nonhu-
man species exist to serve the needs of the human species, that animals 
are in various senses inferior to human beings, and therefore that one 
can favor human over nonhuman interests according to species status 
alone.”145 ALF members have threatened researchers and others. For ex-
ample: “[l]et this message be clear to all who victimize the innocent [an-
imals]: We’re watching. And by axe, drill, or crowbar—we’re coming 
through your door. Stop or be stopped.”146 
According to the Department of Justice, between 1979 and 1993, 
ALF-affiliated individuals were responsible for more than three hundred 
incidents of break-ins, vandalism, arson, and thefts committed in the 
name of animal rights.147 Other forms of violent action included sending 
letters booby-trapped with razor blades to scientists affiliated with re-
search using animals, and the use of improvised incendiary and explosive 
devices against property, and occasionally, against the homes of re-
searchers.148 
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C. The Training and Personal-Interest Problems 
Another common problem that arises in vigilante action is a prod-
uct of who it is that stands in for the government. Often, vigilantes lack 
police training, but are attempting to perform essentially a policing func-
tion. Vigilantes also have a personal-stake in the problem, rather than 
the dispassionate professionalism that we would hope for in police. Con-
sider an example. 
1. Ranch Rescue 
In the late 1990s, the ranchers trying to make a living along the 
Mexican border, especially those in “the avenue of choice” for illegal 
immigrants entering the United States, had long complained to the U.S. 
Border Patrol about the failure to stem the flow of illegals.149 The illegal 
crossers regularly killed their livestock, pulled down their fences thereby 
allowing cattle to stray and get injured or stolen, damaged their trucks 
and equipment, and broke into their houses.150 The easy and unchecked 
flow across the border also attracted drug smugglers, who came heavily 
armed and were highly dangerous.151 
After getting no help despite their repeated pleas, several of the 
ranchers organized “Ranch Rescue,” an organization that sought to do 
what the government refused to do.152 Volunteers patrolled the border 
using the same kind of equipment and tactics as the Border Patrol.153 
Other organizations, such as Arizona Guard, were born from this ef-
fort.154 The group typically detained the trespassers and turned them over 
to the Border Patrol.155 By 2006, Ranch Rescue claimed to have stopped 
more than 12,000 illegal entries.156 
Yet, the members of Ranch Rescue were hardly the best people to 
have performing this role. They did not have the training to properly 
screen suspects or to most effectively detain them without harm. But 
even with better training, the members of the group would not have been 
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a substitute for professional law enforcement officers detached from the 
conflict. The ranchers were the most interested of parties, more likely to 
have the emotional response of a person defending their property and 
themselves. Mistake and overreaction seem inevitable in such situations. 
Roger Barnett, one of the founders of Ranch Rescue, and Casey 
Nethercott, one of its members, were both civilly sued by illegal immi-
grants for making angry threats and for the use of force when detaining 
them.157 Nethercott ultimately lost his ranch in the civil lawsuits.158 While 
the group was effective in stopping some illegal entries and successful in 
dramatizing and humanizing the illegal entry problem—the number of 
Border Patrol agents has doubled since that time159—the loss of this 
ranch was an ignominious end to a project aimed at saving ranches.160 
D. The Displacement Problem 
A final problem common to moral vigilante action is what might be 
called the displacement problem. Consider an example. 
1. The Crown Heights Maccabees 
In 1964, Crown Heights, New York, was awash in rampant crime 
and violence. The Hasidic Jewish community stood isolated between two 
high-crime areas, and persons from outside the neighborhood perp-
etrated most of the crime.161 Yeshiva students were regularly attacked 
and robbed.162 Home invasions turned violent.163 People feared rapists 
and muggers and became wary of even walking in the street.164 Shops be-
gan to close earlier and open later.165 
A local resident, Rabbi Samuel Schrage, sought additional police 
patrols, even meeting with New York Mayor Robert Wagner, but his re-
peated pleas were ignored.166 Schrage then formed the Crown Heights 
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Maccabees, a neighborhood watch group—one of the first of its kind—
with four squad cars, a radio network, and other equipment, all funded 
by the community.167 The patrols were set such that no block of the 
neighborhood would be without surveillance for more than two 
minutes.168 More than one hundred residents volunteered and were given 
instruction.169 
The Maccabees’ goal was to be a deterrent force. The group was ef-
fective: when an outsider to the neighborhood would plan or begin an of-
fense, they would then break off when the Maccabees came by on patrol 
or in response to a radio call from their network.170 On some occasions, a 
confrontation with suspects would ensue.171 But once the Maccabees’ 
practice became known, fewer offenders came to the neighborhood to 
commit their crimes.172 
The results were dramatic. From December 1963 to December 
1964, crime fell by ninety percent.173 A serial rapist attacking women in 
the areas around that patrolled by the Maccabees never attacked within 
their area again.174 
But the striking success of the Maccabees was also a problem. Many 
of the robberies and rapes that were deterred in the Maccabees area may 
well have been simply displaced to surrounding neighborhoods, aggra-
vating the growing disparity in crime rates. The adjacent areas were pre-
dominantly African-American. The crime-rate disparity, along with 
claims of racial profiling, increased racial tensions, sometimes to the boil-
ing point. 
If the government had taken its obligation to keep all of its citizens 
safe more seriously—if it had not left the Jews in Crown Heights to fend 
for themselves—it likely could have avoided the crime disparity and the 
racial tensions. Only a society-wide crime-control program can be truly 
effective. Vigilantes, almost by definition, cannot provide this. 
E. The Solution 
Vigilantism, even when it is moral and effective, is no substitute for 
official action. Whenever community members feel compelled to do what 
the criminal justice system has failed to do, they can never be an effective 
replacement and will always incur a societal cost that could have been 
avoided. 
But the solution to the problem is not to insist that the potential 
moral vigilantes simply suffer in silence. First, this may not be possible: 
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 168. Shaer, supra note 161. 
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 170. Id. 
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 173. Scott, supra note 161, at 3. 
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strong feelings of disillusionment and victimization often spark action. 
More importantly, it ought not be asked: the government has obligations 
to its citizens under its social contract, and the government is not free to 
simply choose not to perform them. The criminal justice system ought to 
take seriously its obligation to assure that justice is done and crime is 
avoided whenever possible, so that people are never put in the position 
of having to consider moral vigilantism. 
Prosecuting the vigilantes is possible, of course, but that may only 
contribute to the community’s cynicism: the same system that is appar-
ently unable to effectively punish drug dealers seems fully capable, 
somehow, of punishing those willing to step in to do the government’s 
job in fighting them. Thus, the prosecution of the moral vigilante could 
change a community’s view from feeling that the system is simply indif-
ferent to the problem, to a feeling that the system is openly hostile to 
solving it. 
IV. SPARKING THE VIGILANTE IMPULSE: DOCTRINES OF 
DISILLUSIONMENT 
Against this backdrop, it is unfortunate that the U.S. criminal justice 
system has adopted a wide range of rules, policies, and practices that es-
sentially guarantee that serious offenses by blameworthy offenders 
caught by the police nonetheless will go unpunished. Often by court deci-
sion, but sometimes as a result of insensitive policy-making or adjudica-
tion processes,175 the current system commonly adopts practices that it 
knows will produce regular and serious failures of justice. 
As noted at the start of this Article, some failures of justice may be 
unavoidable and can be easily forgiven by even a demanding public. The 
criminal justice system can only do so much to catch offenders and to re-
liably reconstruct what happened during some past event. Few people 
are likely to hold such failures against a system otherwise trying its best 
to do justice; the public would be appalled by the wrongful convictions 
and unjust punishment that might result from cutting corners on reliable 
adjudication of the facts. The doctrines at issue here are of a different 
sort: they allow the escape from deserved punishment by serious offend-
ers who are in custody and whose guilt is clear. The offender’s release 
may be as much a surprise to him as it is a shock to the community. He 
has won the lottery! But his release portrays to the community a criminal 
justice system indifferent to the importance of doing justice. 
Below are a few illustrations, all instances in which the system’s 
rules worked as designed and written—these are not law-breaking rogue 
judges at work—yet the resulting failures of justice can seem appalling to 
the average citizen. 
                                                                                                                                      
 175. But sometimes through the distortion of American crime politics. See ROBINSON, 
INTUITIONS OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 128–39. 
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A. Unchecked Punishment Discretion 
A common source of failures of justice is the exercise of idiosyn-
cratic discretion by sentencing judges and parole commissions. Consider 
several examples. 
1. Leaving Sentencing Discretion Unchecked 
Fifteen-year-old Latasha Harlins walked into a liquor store in South 
Central Los Angeles to buy a bottle of juice.176 The following encounter 
was caught on the store’s security tape. As she walked up to the register, 
Harlins put the juice in an outside pocket of her backpack, where it was 
partially visible.177 She had two dollars in her hand to pay for it, but the 
storeowner, Soon Ja Du, apparently did not see the money.178 She ac-
cused Harlins of shoplifting, which Harlins denied.179 Du grabbed at 
Harlins to get the juice, which fell to the ground.180 Harlins responded to 
the assault by punching Du in the face, knocking her down behind the 
counter.181 Du then threw a stool at Harlins.182 Harlins placed the juice on 
the counter, but Du knocked it away.183 Harlins turned to leave.184 Du 
then shot Harlins in the back of the head with a .38 revolver from three 
feet away, killing her instantly, with two dollars still clutched in her 
hand.185 
Du was indicted for first-degree murder.186 At trial, the judge dis-
missed the first-degree murder charge, leaving the jury only the offense 
of voluntary manslaughter, of which Du was convicted.187 The judge used 
her discretion to suspend a jail sentence, and instead sentenced Du to 
five years probation, a $500 dollar fine, and community service.188 
In another case, Vincent Chin, a young Chinese-American man, was 
at a strip club in Highland Park, Michigan, for his bachelor party.189 At 
                                                                                                                                      
 176. For sources on the facts of this case see, e.g., People v. Du, 5 Cal. App. 4th 822, 825–27 
(1992); see also Linda Deutsch, Prosecutor Says Korean Shopkeeper Didn’t Act in Self Defense, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 7, 1991), http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1991/Prosecutor-Says-Korean-
Shopkeeper-Didn-t-Act-in-Self-Defense/id-1ad0f4210194be9581767d27d334ecb0; Karen Nikos, Mis-
carriage of Justice’ Claimed: Reiner Blasts Judge’s Probation Sentence for Korean Grocer in Slaying, 
L.A. DAILY NEWS, Nov. 19, 1991. 
 177. See Du, 5 Cal. App. 4th at 826. 
 178. Id. 
 179. See id. 
 180. Id. at 826–27. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 827. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. See id. at 829; see also Lisa Richardson, Legacy of the Riots: 1992-2002, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 27, 
2002, available at 2002 WLNR 12418799 [hereinafter Richardson, Legacy of the Riots].  
 189. United States v. Ebens, 800 F.2d 1422, 1427–28 (6th Cir. 1986) (abrogated by Huddleston v. 
United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988)); Ross Parker, It’s Not Fair . . . Vincent Chin’s Last Words, CT. 
LEGACY, Nov. 2007, at 1, 2, available at http://www.fbamich.org/Portals/31/Documents/Newsletters/ 
200711_Court_Legacy.pdf. 
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the club, Chin got into an argument with Ronald Ebens and Ebens’ step-
son, Michael Nitz.190 Ebens was a supervisor at a local auto factory and 
mistakenly assumed that Chin was of Japanese descent.191 During the dis-
agreement, Ebens made racially charged remarks, calling Chin a “chink” 
and a “nip,” and claiming that “it’s because of you little motherfuckers 
that we’re all out of work,” a reference to the difficulties the U.S. auto 
industry was facing against Japanese imports at the time.192 The verbal 
insults soon degenerated into a barroom brawl, in which Chin injured 
Nitz.193 They were both ejected from the club but the confrontation con-
tinued outside.194 When Ebens took a baseball bat from his car, Chin and 
his friends gave up any thought of further brawling and fled.195 
Still angry, Ebens and Nitz cruised the area searching for Chin, and 
paid an unemployed local resident $20 to help them find him and his 
friends.196 When they did find him near a McDonald’s two blocks from 
the strip club, Ebens attacked Chin with the baseball bat, striking him 
repeatedly.197 Chin staggered outside and collapsed, where Ebens hit him 
again, striking him twice in the head.198 Chin suffered severe head inju-
ries, was declared brain dead, and died four days later.199 
Ebens and Nitz were charged with second-degree murder.200 As a 
supervisor at the nearby Chrysler plant in Detroit, where he had worked 
for seventeen years, Ebens was popular at the plant and among his 
neighbors in Eastpointe.201 County prosecutors allowed Ebens and Nitz 
to plea guilty to manslaughter.202 Despite the probation officer’s presen-
tence report recommending a prison term, the judge sentenced Ebens 
and Nitz to a fine and three years probation.203 The judge later justified 
his sentence by stating that “[t]hese weren’t the kind of men you sent to 
jail . . . . You don’t make the punishment fit the crime: you make the 
punishment fit the criminal.”204 
Cases like Ja Du’s killing of Latasha Harlin and Ebens’ and Nitz’s 
killing of Vincent Chin dramatically illustrate the problem of unchecked 
sentencing discretion. People will judge that an offender’s sentence ought 
to be the product of what was done, as well as his state of mind and ca-
pabilities at the time of the offense, not a product of his good or bad luck 
in the sentencing judge he draws. Even more disillusioning is the possibil-
                                                                                                                                      
 190. Ebens, 800 F.2d at 1427–28. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at 1428; Parker, supra note 189, at 2. 
 197. Ebens, 800 F.2d at 1428. 
 198. Parker, supra note 189, at 2. 
 199. Ebens, 800 F.2d at 1428. 
 200. Parker, supra note 189, at 3. 
 201. Id. at 1. 
 202. Id. at 3. 
 203. Id. at 3–4. 
 204. Id. at 4.  
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ity of unchecked bias—for or against the race of the offender, or his vic-
tim, or for or against the outsider, or insider, or other status of the of-
fender, or his victim. Is the well-connected local to be judged by a differ-
ent standard than the wrong-colored victim? 
Even setting aside egregious forms of bias and prejudice, individual 
sentencing judges commonly look to idiosyncratic factors that few in the 
community would support. For example, a recent empirical study showed 
that a variety of factors have been used in mitigating criminal punish-
ment, even though there is little public support for them: special talents 
(only 10.6% of subjects supported this as a basis for mitigation, averaged 
across a range of offense seriousness), good deeds before the offense 
(15.0%), old age (22.3%), bad deeds or character (17.0%).205 Unguided 
sentencing discretion simply invites biased sentencing at worst and idio-
syncratic sentencing at best. 
Much of the problem can be avoided by use of sentencing guide-
lines, which retain some judicial sentencing discretion to individualize 
punishment, yet offer some guidance to reduce unjustified disparity. Yet, 
as of 2006, almost two-thirds of the states—thirty-one of fifty—have no 
sentencing guidelines.206 The system’s reputation for doing justice is likely 
to suffer accordingly. 
2. Early Release of Parole 
In 1980, while at a bar in Chester, Pennsylvania, Cornelius Ferguson 
shot and killed a man.207 He was convicted of third degree murder, but 
served only a short stint in prison.208 Soon after his release, in September 
1985, Ferguson shot and wounded another man and was convicted of ag-
gravated assault.209 As a result of this conviction, he was sentenced to five 
years in prison for felony aggravated assault.210 His release on parole for 
his earlier murder was revoked, but in 1991, in spite of his violent crimi-
nal record, he was again released on parole.211 
                                                                                                                                      
 205. Paul H. Robinson et al., Extralegal Punishment Factors: A Study of Forgiveness, Hardship, 
Good-Deeds, Apology, Remorse, and Other Such Discretionary Factors in Assessing Criminal Punish-
ment, 65 VAND. L. REV. 737, 740–66, 782 tbl.5 (2012). 
 206. The following states have no sentencing Guidelines: Arizona, California, Colorado,  
Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,  
Massachusetts, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, 
New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, 
West Virginia, and Wyoming. Rachael E. Barkow & Kathleen M. O’Neill, Delegating Punitive Power: 
The Political Economy of Sentencing Commission and Guideline Formation, 84 TEX. L. REV. 873, 1994 
tbl.1 (2006). 
 207. For sources on the facts of this case, see, for example, Hameen v. State, 212 F.3d 226, 230–32 
(3d Cir. 2000); Ferguson v. State, 642 A.2d 772, 784 (Del. 1994); Ferguson v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 
534 A.2d 579 (Pa. Commw. 1987); Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 1987 Pa. Super. LEXIS 8078 (Pa. Su-
per. Ct. May 27, 1987); see also Death Row Executions, STATE OF DEL., http://doc.delaware.gov/ 
deathrow/executions.shtml (last visited Nov. 4, 2014). 
 208. Ferguson v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 534 A.2d at 580. 
 209. Ferguson v. State, 642 A.2d at 784. 
 210. Ferguson v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 534 A.2d at 580. 
 211. Ferguson v. State, 642 A.2d at 784–85. 
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Soon after his release, Ferguson shot and wounded Jimmy Mitchell, 
but was not caught.212 About two months later, he arranged to meet with 
Troy Hodges, a potential buyer for a half-kilogram of cocaine for 
$10,000.213 Ferguson and his associate brought no drugs to the gathering, 
apparently intending to rob Hodges instead of selling to him.214 During 
the meeting, Ferguson shot Hodges in the back at point blank range, us-
ing the same gun he had used to shoot Jimmy Mitchell.215 
Such cases of early release on parole no doubt leave much of the 
public skeptical about the system’s motivations. Did the sentencing judge 
impose the wrong sentence at the start? If so, why not fix that bad judg-
ing? If the sentencing judge did not err, why should the offender be re-
leased “early” at all? Why should he suffer anything less that the pun-
ishment he deserves? 
Part of the problematic impression created comes from the system’s 
demonstrated obfuscation. A sentence is publicly announced in court, 
but turns out not to be the real sentence—indeed, the announced sen-
tence may never be the sentence actually served. The public perception is 
likely that some other group (the parole commission) announces the real 
sentence in the privacy of the prison, out of public and local view. If the 
system is designed to be this opaque, how many other outrageous cases 
are as bad or worse than the outrageous case the citizen happens to hear 
about?  
It was in part a response to this problem that the federal Sentencing 
Reform Act of 1984 introduced so-called “truth in sentencing,” which 
abolished the U.S. Parole Commission and required that all offenders 
serve at least eighty-five percent of the sentence imposed in court (but 
will continue to have a period of supervision after their release).216 But 
most states still retain some form of parole commission that provides  
early release.217 
B. Criminal Justice, the Game 
Another source of disillusioning failures of justice are judicial deci-
sions that treat criminal justice as a game in which players are given a set 
of rules and the rules are to be blindly enforced no matter what the effect 
on justice or fairness—rules for their own sake. A clever defense tactic 
calculated to deceive can produce a dismissal with prejudice, even if the 
                                                                                                                                      
 212. Id. at 785. 
 213. Id. at 785–86. 
 214. Id. at 785. 
 215. Id. 
 216. H.R. REP. NO. 98-1017, at 114–15 (1984); see also S. REP. NO. 98-223, at 33–36 (1983) (“[T]he 
sentencing judges and parole officials are constantly second-guessing each other, and, as a result, pris-
oners and the public are seldom certain about the real sentence a defendant will serve.”). 
 217. PAULA M. DITTON & DORIS JAMES WILSON, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT: TRUTH IN SENTENCING IN STATE PRISONS 3 (1999) (“Fourteen States 
have abolished early release by discretion of a parole board for all offenders. . . . A few other states 
have abolished parole board release for certain violent or felony offenders (Alaska, New York,  
Tennessee, and Virginia) or for certain crimes against a person (Louisiana).”).  
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violation results in no actual unfairness to the defendant, or results in a 
disadvantage that can be fully remedied through some less justice-
distorting means. Consider several examples. 
1. Speedy Trial as a Sword Rather than a Shield 
 In August 1992, Kevin Healy picked up hitchhiker Laura Sage near 
Cicero, Illinois.218 Sage offered to have sex with him for cash, money she 
would spend on drugs.219 He agreed, and in November, when his wife was 
in the hospital, Healy looked Sage up again.220 When they had a disa-
greement about how much Healy would pay, Sage threatened to tell his 
wife.221 Angry, Healy kneeled on top of Sage, choked her, beat her with a 
flashlight, strangled her to death, and dumped her body in the Chicago 
River.222 After her body was found, a police investigation led to Healy, 
who was arrested.223 
In preparation for trial, the prosecution had ordered forensic sam-
ples, but due to delays at the laboratory, the prosecutor asked for a num-
ber of postponements to the start of trial.224 Each time a new date was 
sought, Healy’s lawyer would say something like, “I have no problem 
with any date in May, judge.”225 The first time this exchange occurred, the 
trial judge, in an abundance of caution, asked defense counsel to confirm 
that this was a “by-agreement date,” to which counsel repeated, “any 
date in May, we will be there.”226 
Healy was ultimately convicted of Sage’s murder and sentenced to 
thirty years in prison, but his counsel argued on appeal that his carefully-
worded statements were technically only an acquiesce, not an agreement 
to the postponement, thus not technically a waiver under the speedy-trial 
rules.227 Thus, Healy’s trial was begun 65 days past the 120 days from ar-
rest that was allowed absent a waiver by the defendant.228 The appellate 
                                                                                                                                      
 218. See, e.g., People v. Healy, 688 N.E.2d 786, 787 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997); People v. Healy, 1992 WL 
12580086 (Ill. Cir. Dec. 10, 1992); see also Maurice Possley & Jerry Thomas, Trial Delays May Set 
Murderer Free: Appeals Court Voids Man’s Conviction in ‘92 Killing of Woman, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 5, 
1997, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1997-12-05/news/9712050153_1_illinois_supreme_court_trial 
_act_conviction; David Southwell, Killer Freed Because He Was Denied Speedy Trial, CHI. SUN-TIMES, 
Apr. 18, 1998, available at http://highbeam.com/doc/1P2-4441344.html. 
 219. Healy, 688 N.E.2d at 787. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. at 788–89. 
 225. Id. at 788. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. at 789, 791. 
 228. Id. at 789. The Illinois Appellate Court held that the defendant had no duty to inform the 
trial court that the time limit was about to expire. Id. at 792. In response to this result, the Illinois stat-
ute that permitted Healy to walk free was later amended to prevent a similar result in the future. 
“Now, a defendant may use [the speedy trial provision] as a ‘shield’ to prevent an untimely trial, but 
not as a ‘sword’ to defeat a conviction after the fact.” Vill. of Mundelein v. Bogachev, 952 N.E.2d 91, 
96 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (citation omitted).  
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court reversed the conviction and Healy walked free, beyond prosecution 
for his beating and murder of Sage.229 
Again, much of the community will wonder how so trivial an incon-
venience to Healy, with no indication of any real prejudice, made evident 
in defense counsel’s acquiescence in the delay, could entitle him to beat 
another human to death with impunity. And, in this instance, it appears 
that this outrage is simply the product of clever gamesmanship by a smart 
defense counsel—gamesmanship that the court apparently was willing to 
honor in place of an assessment of any actual unfairness or inequity in 
the situation. With these cases, the criminal justice system presents itself 
as uninterested in justice and fairness, but rather as a system that sees the 
process as a game, in which the cleverest gamer wins. 
Few countries allow this kind of inflexible application of a speedy-
trial right.230 Countries that have such a right often use sanctions other 
than dismissal and construct a sanction that attempts to compensate for 
any fairness and equity.231 Most take account of a wide range of factors in 
assessing a violation,232 including, for example, the impropriety of the 
                                                                                                                                      
 229. Healy, 688 N.E.2d at 792. The Illinois Supreme Court denied the state’s petition to overrule 
the decision of the lower court. People v. Healy, 698 N.E.2d 546 (Ill. 1998) (table decision). 
 230. See, e.g., David Clark, The Icon of Liberty: The Status and Role of Magna Carta in Australian 
and New Zealand Law, 24 MELB. U. L. REV. 866, 873 (stating that the right to a speedy trial has been 
rejected in Australia and New Zealand); see R. v. Morin [1992] 1 S.C.R. 771 (Can.) (holding that the 
right to a speedy trial is equivalent to a “trial within a reasonable time”). 
 231. See, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam, Speedy Criminal Trial: Rights and Remedies, 27 STAN. L. 
REV. 525, 533–34 (1975) (noting that in England, the English Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 is commonly 
interpreted to grant only “release from custody, but neither expedition nor abatement of the criminal 
prosecution”). In the Netherlands, courts assess whether the right to be heard within a reasonable time 
has been violated then, if a breach is found, the remedy is a reduction in the penalty that would have 
otherwise been imposed. Martin Kuijer, The Right to a Fair Trial: Effective Remedy for Excessively 
Lengthy Proceedings (Articles 6 and 13 ECHR), European Judicial Training Network Seminar: Effec-
tive Remedies, Lengthy Proceedings and Access to Justice in the EU 10 (Feb. 28, 2013). “The degree 
to which the penalty is reduced depends on the degree to which the reasonable time limit has been 
overrun and the severity of the penalty imposed.” Id. at 11. “In other European countries, legislative 
reforms are underway.” Id. In Bulgaria, for instance, attempts have been made to create a right to 
compensation for excessively lengthy proceedings. Id. “Draft legislative reforms [to the State and Mu-
nicipality Responsibility for Damage Acts] are expected to be prepared by Ministry of Justice working 
group during 2012 and adopted by the National Assembly thereafter.” Id. A similar initiative was tak-
en in Slovenia and Portugal. Id.  
 232. See R. v. Morin [1992] 1 S.C.R. 771, para. 48 (Can.) (holding that courts should consider the 
caseload of the jurisdiction and the prejudice to the accused). In Jago v District Court of NSW (1989) 
168 CLR 23 (Austl.), the High Court of Australia held that, though there is no common law right to a 
speedy trial, there is a right to receive a fair trial. If circumstances, including unreasonable delay had 
the effect of depriving a trial of its fairness, then a permanent stay of the proceedings is warranted. Id. 
However, courts in Australia do not grant this remedy readily and require demonstration of extreme 
circumstances. Id.; see Robert M. Bloom, Judicial Integrity: A Call for Its Re-Emergence in the Adjudi-
cation of Criminal Cases, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 462, 487 (1993) (citing Jago v District Court 
of NSW (1989) 168 CLR 23 (Austl.)). In Japan, Article 37(1) of the Constitution provides accused per-
sons the right to a ‘speedy and public trial,’ a right modeled after the United States Constitution. 
However, courts in Japan do not dismiss cases for failure to provide a speedy trial notwithstanding 
that some cases may take well over a decade to try. The case involving the subway sarin incident, for 
instance, has been proceeding for over a decade. CARL F. GOODMAN, THE RULE OF LAW IN JAPAN: A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 497 (3d ed. 2012). 
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prosecution’s conduct under the circumstances and the actual extent of 
prejudice to the accused.233 
2. Enforcing Bargained Immunity Built on Defense Lies and 
Deceptions 
 Consider another case, arising in a different context but with a  
similar attitude about criminal justice. In the summer of 1979, Jean 
Packwood and Donald Desbiens robbed three banks in San Francisco.234 
Desbiens became worried that his girlfriend, Janette Pimentel, knew 
about the robberies and could implicate them.235 To avoid this situation, 
Packwood and Desbiens took her to a park in San Francisco in the early 
morning hours of July 23, 1979, and “shot [her] to death execution 
style.”236 
Arrested in New York in 1980, Packwood confessed to the rob-
beries but claimed that Desbiens had done the murder of Pimentel 
alone.237 Desbiens had asked him to assist, he said, but he had refused.238 
Based on this, Packwood worked out a plea agreement in which he pled 
guilty to the bank robberies and received a reduced sentence in exchange 
for assisting authorities in the prosecution of Desbiens for Pimentel’s 
murder.239 The terms for the deal rendered it invalid if Packwood “will-
fully gave materially incomplete or false . . . information.”240 
Later that year, authorities learned that two people had given 
statements saying Packwood and Desbiens had murdered Pimentel to-
gether, including a statement reporting Packwood’s detailed description 
of how they had done it.241 Eventually, Desbiens confessed to the murder, 
describing how he and Packwood had done it, and was tried and con-
victed of it, and sentenced to life in prison.242 
Prosecutors then sought to convict Packwood for his part in the 
murder, but Packwood claimed his plea agreement protected him.243 
Prosecutors pointed out that his deal was contingent on full and accurate 
information.244 But Packwood argued that at sometime prior to the kill-
ing, Desbiens had asked, and Packwood had, at that moment, declined to 
                                                                                                                                      
 233. PAUL H. ROBINSON & MICHAEL T. CAHILL, LAW WITHOUT JUSTICE 250 (Oxford Univ. 
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 243. Id. 
 244. See id.; see generally Packwood, 687 F. Supp at 472 (Packwood’s plea deal). 
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participate.245 It was at some time later that he agreed to participate in 
the killing.246 He argued, then, that his statement to authorities was not 
false—he had declined to help, albeit only on an earlier occasion.247 He 
argued that investigators should have asked a more specific question to 
dispel the misperception he had given them.248 Applying the contract 
principle that any an ambiguity in a contract is to be resolved against the 
drafter, contra proferentem, the court accepted the argument and 
quashed the indictment.249 Packwood’s clever moves, and the system’s 
willingness to give deference to them—to treat the criminal justice  
process as a game, rather than an exercise in fairness and justice—let 
Packwood kill Pimentel with impunity.250 
It is easy to see how a citizen could conclude that the law does not 
care about the seriousness of the offense, the extent of the rule violation 
or whether the offender suffers any actual unfairness or disadvantage. 
The fact that Packwood’s clever ability to answer questions while omit-
ting much of the truth was somehow worth more than the brutal killing 
of Janette Pimentel is both disappointing and bewildering. It would be 
little surprise if we found that the system’s reputation became badly 
soiled by its apparent blindness to the meaning and importance of fair-
ness and justice. 
The American mindset in this context is no different from that 
which gave deference to the defense counsel’s careful-language trick in 
the Kevin Healy speedy trial case.251 As the average person will see it, 
that trick was judged to be worth ignoring Healy’s brutal murder of 
Laura Sage, just as Packwood’s trick here was judged to be worth more 
than Janette Pimentel’s life. It is easy for the public to perceive a system 
grown indifferent to the importance of doing justice; one that gives def-
erence to such trickery, trivializing brutal killings. To the public, the sys-
tem is beyond caring about actual unfairness and prejudice to defendants 
and interested instead in playing the rules of the game. 
This blindness to actual effects on fairness and justice is not typical 
in the rest of the world, but rather a peculiar American approach. The 
European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) looks to the ulti-
mate effect on fairness,252 rather than providing an automatic right to go 
free. In the context of speedy trial, for example, the U.K. House of Lords 
relies upon the ECHR provision to make clear that a remediable right 
                                                                                                                                      
 245. Packwood, 848 F.2d at 1010. 
 246. See id. 
 247. Id. at 1012. 
 248. Packwood, 687 F. Supp. at 474. 
 249. Id. at 473–75. 
 250. See id. at 473–74 ; Jewell, supra note 234. 
 251. In which the defense agreed to prosecution requests for trial continuations using careful lan-
guage that they could later argue did not technically qualify as a waiver. See supra text accompanying 
notes 224–29.  
 252. AG’s Reference No. 2 of 2001, [2003] UKHL 68, [10] (appeal taken from Eng.), available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200304/ldjudgmt/jd031211/ref2-1.htm (“[T]he focus of [Ar-
ticle 6.1 of the European Convention on Human Rights] is on achieving a result which is, and is seen 
to be, fair.”). 
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exists only if the delay causes harmful consequences to a defendant.253 
New Zealand takes a similar approach, holding that where a delay has 
not affected the “fairness” of a trial, a remedy departing from normal tri-
al procedure is unnecessary.254 
C. Defenses for Clearly Guilty Offenders 
A final source of disillusionment is the practice of providing rules 
that shield even clearly guilty offenders of very serious crimes. Consider 
four examples. 
1. Exclusionary Rule 
Larry Eyler picked up, tortured, mutilated, and murdered a series of 
eighteen young men, including Gustavo Herrera and Ralph Calise.255 Po-
lice suspected Eyler in the killings, and began trying to follow him during 
his nighttime drives, but lacked probable cause to arrest him for the 
murders.256 Early one morning, a highway trooper, who was unaware of 
the investigation, happened upon Eyler parked on the side of the high-
way.257 The trooper made a U-turn and intercepted Eyler as he and his 
passenger, now back in Eyler’s pick-up, attempted to leave.258 Unknown 
to the trooper, Eyler was in the process of coaxing the intended victim, 
Daryl Hayward, into the woods with a promise of money for sex and had 
in his hand his kit of rope and tape.259 The trooper became suspicious 
when Eyler was evasive in his answers and seemed like he was trying to 
hide the kit he had been carrying when the trooper first saw him.260 
The trooper radioed his headquarters to ask about Eyler.261 The in-
vestigators who had been following Eyler earlier that night, but had lost 
him, overheard this call.262 They rushed to the scene and brought Eyler 
and his truck back to the station for further investigation.263 Hayward 
confessed that they were about to have sex for money.264 Eyler gave the 
officers permission to take his boots, which the investigators noticed 
matched the imprints left at a previous murder scene.265 He also gave 
permission for them to search his truck, in which they found clothesline 
                                                                                                                                      
 253. Id. at [135]. 
 254. Id. at [85] (discussing Martin v. Dist. Court at Tauranga (1995), 2 NZLR 419 (C.A.)). 
 255. Michael Newton, Larry Eyler, The Highway Murderer: Caged, CRIME LIBRARY 5, http:// 
www.crimelibrary.com/serial_killers/predators/eyler/caged_5.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2014). 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. 
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and surgical tape like that used in previous murders, as well as a bloody 
knife.266 
They did not arrest Eyler, but instead released him and his truck 
later that day.267 However, they obtained a warrant to search the home 
where Eyler was staying.268 There they found handcuffs, credit card  
receipts, and phone records that tied him overwhelmingly to previous 
murders.269 Laboratory analysis of the seized evidence confirmed their 
suspicions.270 
Eyler was later arrested for the murders.271 Eyler was released and 
the seized evidence was suppressed, however, because a court deter-
mined that taking Eyler to the station for investigation was effectively an 
arrest and that, at that point, there was insufficient probable cause to ar-
rest Eyler.272 The court’s order excluded not only the evidence obtained 
with Eyler’s permission at the station, but also the evidence obtained 
pursuant to the warrant to search Eyler’s apartment, because the warrant 
was based upon the illegally-seized evidence, and thus was excluded un-
der the doctrine of the “fruit of the poisonous tree.”273 
The inconvenience of the trip to the station and the twelve hours he 
was detained meant, under the criminal justice system, that Eyler’s  
tortures and killings of those eighteen young men could not be pun-
ished—that is forty minutes detention per killing. Eyler’s release is both 
puzzling—even to Eyler—and an outrage. A frustrated Sheriff Robert 
Babcox, as he watched Eyler drive off after release, said, “He is freed to 
kill. Hell, it’s only a matter of time.”274 
The inconvenience to Eyler seems so comparatively trivial. How 
could it possibly justify letting him torture and murder eighteen young 
men with impunity? If the violation of Eyler’s rights really was so serious 
a violation as to justify letting Eyler go free, then why have not all of the 
police officials who perpetrated this violation been put in jail? Why is the 
only effect that Eyler can murder with impunity? 
                                                                                                                                      
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. 
 273. The trial court determined that the initial stop was proper, however, the following twelve-
hour detention at the police station was improper because it was not supported by probable cause. A 
Terry stop only allows detaining a person based on a “reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal 
activity and the ‘frisk’ or pat-down search for weapons of the person detained,” thus to handcuff Eyler 
and detain him at the police station required probable cause that he had committed an offense. People 
v. Eyler, 132 Ill. App. 3d 792, 800 (1985). The trial judge determined that probable cause could not 
flow from a statement from Eyler’s passenger (Daryl Hayward) since Hayward’s statement only estab-
lished probable cause with respect to the crime of prostitution. See id. at 810. On appeal, the Appellate 
Court of Illinois upheld the trial court’s finding that “there was a direct ‘nexus’ between the illegal 
arrest of the defendant and the subsequent statement made by Hayward” and agreed that Hayward’s 
statement did not establish probable cause to arrest Eyler because “the tainted statement [concerning 
Eyler’s solicitation] cannot be used to establish probable cause to arrest [Eyler] on a separate crime.” 
See id. at 806. 
 274. ROBINSON & CAHILL, LAW WITHOUT JUSTICE, supra note 233, at 148.  
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To nonlawyers, the effect of the exclusionary rule is genuinely bi-
zarre. The rule seems to ignore the seriousness of the offense, the relia-
bility of the evidence, and the extent of actual unfairness to the defend-
ant in order to focus on a trivial violation of defendant’s rights. As the 
late Stanford scholar John Kaplan noted in 1974: 
[T]he United States is the only nation that applies an automatic ex-
clusionary rule . . . . [T]here are many other countries which do not 
have a mandatory exclusionary rule but which seem to be at least as 
able as we to prevent their police from intruding upon the rights of 
citizens. In fact, their leading legal representatives express in pri-
vate, and occasionally in public, a complete mystification that the 
United States would adopt a rule that deprives the prosecution of 
reliable evidence of guilt. In other words, the exclusionary rule is 
hardly a facet of American jurisprudence that has aroused admira-
tion the world over.275 
The United States is still nearly alone in the world in applying an 
automatic exclusionary rule,276 and even the few other countries that have 
some form of exclusion take a significantly more flexible approach.277 The 
Canadians, for example, reject the United States’ automatic exclusion in 
favor of a discretionary approach that looks to the effect on the system’s 
reputation. Section 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms provides: 
Where . . . a court concludes that evidence was obtained in a man-
ner that infringed or denied any rights or freedoms guaranteed by 
this Charter, the evidence shall be excluded if it is established that, 
having regard to all the circumstances, the admission of it in the 
proceedings would bring the administration of justice into disre-
pute.278 
In Eyler and cases like it, of course, it is excluding the evidence that 
“would bring the administration of justice into disrepute” in the minds of 
much of the community.279 
The U.K. rules also show a greater concern for the importance of 
doing justice. English law does not, for example, apply the “fruit of the 
poisonous tree” doctrine when the “fruit” is reliable evidence, as in 
Eyler.280 The European Court of Human Rights similarly rejects the 
                                                                                                                                      
 275. John Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1031–32 (1974). 
 276. See James Stribopoulos, Lessons from the Pupil: A Canadian Solution to the American Exclu-
sionary Rule Debate, 22 B.C. INT’L. & COMP. L. REV. 77, 93 (1999). 
 277. Id. at 84 (examining the exclusionary rule in England, Scotland, Australia, and Canada, con-
cluding that each country uses the discretionary approach, which “leads to a more expansive and hon-
est definition of constitutional rights”). 
 278. Id. at 119. 
 279. A Canadian Appellate Court noted: 
Section 24(2) was written to constitute an intermediate position between the automatic exclu-
sionary rule familiar to American Bill of Rights jurisprudence and the automatic inclusionary rule 
of the common law for non-conscriptive real evidence . . . .     
The main purpose of s.24(2) is to protect the reputation of the administration of justice.     
R. v. Harrison, [2008] 89 O.R. (3d) 161 (Can). 
 280. The English exclusionary rule is explained as follows: 
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United States’ automatic exclusion in favor an overall assessment of what 
is fair: “The question which must be answered is whether the proceedings 
as a whole, including the way in which the evidence was obtained, were 
fair.”281 
Overall, other countries tend to focus on the effects on justice and 
fairness rather than on a mere technical rule violation.282 In the United 
Kingdom, for example, whether evidence is admitted depends upon an 
overall assessment of whether it would “have such an adverse effect on 
the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it.”283 
The European Court of Human Rights holds that the European Conven-
tion of Human Rights “does not require suppression of evidence ob-
tained through an illegal search and seizure,” but will provide it if is nec-
essary for an overall fair trial.284 
Six months after his release from the traffic stop incident, Eyler 
used the same truck to pick up another young man, Danny Bridges. 
Eyler then tortured, murdered, and dismembered Bridges’ body.285 
2. Double Jeopardy 
When Melvin Ignatow’s girlfriend, Brenda Schaeffer, said she was 
breaking up with him, he lured her to his house where he raped, tortured, 
and murdered her with the help of a former girlfriend.286 The girlfriend-
accomplice cooperated with police for a reduced sentence, but the jury 
found her trial testimony muddled.287 With this, and Ignatow’s perjuring 
of himself on the stand, Ignatow was acquitted and released.288 Soon af-
ter, the buyers of his old house were remodeling and found, in a heating 
duct, photos that Ignatow had taken of the torture-murder session.289 De-
spite the incontrovertible evidence, and, despite his having obtained the 
                                                                                                                                      
English law does not apply the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine when the “fruit” is reliable 
evidence. For example, when a coerced confession leads to recovery of stolen property, the con-
fession will be suppressed but the property will be admitted in evidence. Thus, the English exclu-
sionary rule as applied to the fruits of excluded confessions is tempered by a reliability principle. 
Gordon Van Kessel, Suspect as a Source of Testimonial Evidence: A Comparison of the English and 
American Approaches, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 29–30 (1986). 
 281. P.G. and J.H. v. United Kingdom, 2001-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 195, ¶ 76 (2001). 
 282. Christopher Slobogin, A Comparative Perspective on the Exclusionary Rule in Search and 
Seizure Cases 8 (Vanderbilt Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 13-21, 2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2247746. 
 283. Id. at 9. 
 284. Khan v. United Kindom, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. 45, ¶¶35, 38 (2000), available at http://www. 
bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2000/195.html (“The central question in the present case [concerning sup-
pression of illegally obtained evidence] is whether the proceedings as a whole were fair.”). 
 285. ROBINSON & CAHILL, LAW WITHOUT JUSTICE, supra note 233, at 148–49. 
 286. BOB HILL, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: OBSESSION, MURDER, AND JUSTICE DENIED 328 (William 
Morrow & Co. 1995) [hereinafter HILL, DOUBLE JEOPARDY]; ROBINSON & CAHILL, LAW WITHOUT 
JUSTICE, supra note 233, at 166. 
 287. HILL, DOUBLE JEOPARDY, supra note 286, at 241; ROBINSON & CAHILL, LAW WITHOUT 
JUSTICE, supra note 233, at 164–65. 
 288. ROBINSON & CAHILL, LAW WITHOUT JUSTICE, supra note 233, at 165, 170. 
 289. HILL, DOUBLE JEOPARDY, supra note 286, at 281. 
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acquittal by perjuring himself at trial, Ignatow was free from prosecution 
for his horrendous murder.290 
In another case, in March 1987, Brenda Spicer’s partially naked 
body was found in a dumpster on the campus of Northeast Louisiana 
University. 291 Spicer had been strangled; sperm was found in her rectum 
and vagina, bruises were found between her legs, and saliva on her 
breasts.292 Ivrin Bolden, a boyfriend of Spicer’s roommate who had a his-
tory of jealousy-fueled disputes with Spicer, was ultimately arrested and 
tried for her murder.293 At trial he denied any involvement with Spicer’s 
death.294 The available physical evidence was not overwhelming and he 
was acquitted.295 
Bolden then moved to Memphis with Spicer’s roommate, Joel  
Tillis.296 In 1989, Tillis’ badly decomposed body, wrapped in red sheets, 
was found in a ditch in Arkansas; she too had been strangled.297 Soon af-
ter, Bolden moved to New Jersey.298 Bolden’s new girlfriend told New 
Jersey police that Bolden had admitted to the two murders.299 After ques-
tioning and a failed polygraph test, Bolden confessed.300 He gave a de-
tailed account of his killing of Spicer: how he lured her to the storage 
locker, raped and strangled her, and then dumped her partially nude 
body on campus, facts that were confirmed by the forensic evidence.301 
Even though he openly admitted murdering Spicer, the previous acquit-
tal based on his perjured testimony barred his prosecution.302 
Why should Ignatow and Bolden walk free from their horrible 
crimes when we have such reliable evidence that they committed them? 
Indeed, by their perjury they helped trick the system into a false acquittal 
the first time around. Why should we let them rape and murder with such 
impunity? The existing law’s answer will not be obvious to much of the 
community. 
                                                                                                                                      
 290. Id., at 248, 303; ROBINSON & CAHILL, LAW WITHOUT JUSTICE, supra note 233, at 166, 170. 
 291. For sources on the facts of this case, see, e.g., Bolden v. Warden, W. Tennessee High Sec. 
Facility, 194 F.3d 579, 580 (5th Cir. 1999); State v. Bolden, 680 So.2d6 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1996); Acquitted 
Man Booked With Perjury, NEW ORLEANS TIMES PICAYUNE, Aug. 29, 1992, available at 1992 WLNR 
808337; Basketball Slayings: Is Boyfriend Killer, or a Freak Victim?, NEW ORLEANS TIMES PICAYUNE, 
July 9, 1989, [hereinafter Basketball Slayings], available at 1989 WLNR 499802; Bolden Faces Perjury 
Charge in Louisiana, MEMPHIS COM. APPEAL, Mar. 10, 1992, available at 1992 WLNR 2658313; see 
also Lawrence Buser, Families Believe They, System Were Fooled by Smiling 2-Time Killer, COM. 
APPEAL, Mar. 9, 1992, [hereinafter 2-Time Killer], available at 1992 WLNR 2696410; Christopher 
Rose, Murder Suspect Returned, NEW ORLEANS TIMES PICAYUNE, Aug. 18, 1991, available at 1991 
WLNR 818104. 
 292. Bolden v. Warden, 194 F.3d at 580; Rose, supra note 291. 
 293. Bolden v. Warden, 194 F.3d at 580; 2-Time Killer, supra note 291. 
 294. Bolden v. Warden, 194 F.3d at 580. 
 295. Id. at 580, 585. 
 296. 2-Time Killer, supra note 291. 
 297. Rose, supra note 291; Murder Suspect Returned, supra note 291. 
 298. Bolden v. Warden, 194 F.3d at 581. 
 299. 2-Time Killer, supra note 291. 
 300. State v. Bolden, 680 So. 2d 6, 11 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1996). 
 301. Id.; 2-Time Killer, supra note 291. 
 302. Bolden was convicted of perjury in the Spicer case, and pled guilty to involuntary manslaugh-
ter for his killing of Tillis. Bolden v. Warden, 194 F.3d at 580–81. 
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Yes, there is a “double jeopardy” prohibition in the U.S.  
Constitution, but the courts are the ones who have filled in the meaning 
of that phrase, and they have already recognized many obviously appro-
priate exceptions—instances where an offender may be twice put in 
jeopardy at trial. For example, a retrial is permitted if an offender’s con-
viction is reversed, even though nothing in the constitutional language 
authorizes this.303 Similarly, we allow a retrial if a first trial ends in a mis-
trial or a hung jury.304 We also allow a second trial, even after an acquit-
tal, when brought by a different state, or by federal prosecutors, even if it 
is prosecution for the exact same conduct alleged to be criminal.305 Why 
not also except cases like Ignatow and Bolden, where there is compelling 
evidence of guilt and the offender helped induce the wrongful acquittal 
through perjury at trial? 
Most countries, if they have a double jeopardy bar at all, would not 
apply it in the rigid way the United States does.306 For example, most 
countries allow appeals after acquittals.307 In the United Kingdom, under 
                                                                                                                                      
 303. See, e.g., Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 189 (1957). 
 304. See, e.g., Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 324 (1984); Oregon v. Kennedy, 465 U.S. 
667, 672–73 (1982). 
 305. Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 89–90 (1985) (explaining that the dual sovereign doctrine 
permits prosecution of the same offense in both state and federal court because “the States are sepa-
rate sovereigns with respect to the Federal Government because each State’s power to prosecute is 
derived from its own ‘inherent sovereignty,’ not from the Federal Government”); Paul G. Cassell, The 
Rodney King Trials and the Double Jeopardy Clause: Some Observations on Original Meaning and the 
ACLU’s Schizophrenic Views of the Dual Sovereign Doctrine, 41 UCLA L. REV. 693, 695–97 (1994) 
(explaining double jeopardy in the context of the Rodney King trials). Again, nothing in the Constitu-
tion’s prohibition of “double jeopardy” authorizes an exception for such a second prosecution. Rather, 
courts permit it by any number of arguments, saying, for example, that “jeopardy did not attach” be-
cause of some set of conditions or saying “jeopardy does not apply” because of some policy reason, 
such as the “independent sovereignty” of state and federal jurisdictions. Double jeopardy also does 
not apply when circumstances are such that the defendant is never actually “in jeopardy” of conviction 
in the first trial. For example, if the defendant bribes the judge in exchange for acquittal in the first 
trial, then the outcome was never in doubt and retrial is permitted. Aleman v. Judges of the Circuit 
Court, 138 F.3d 302, 308–09 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 306. See Mario Chiavario, The Rights of the Defendant and the Victim, in EUR. CRIM. 
PROCEDURES 541, 574 n.91 (Mireille Delmas-Marty & J. R. Spencer eds., 2002) (“The German provi-
sion allows the case to be reopened where the defendant’s case was helped by a false document or 
false evidence, where a judge . . . committed a punishable offense; and where the acquitted defendant 
makes a credible confession.”); K.N. CHANDRASEKHARAN PILLAI, DOUBLE JEOPARDY PROTECTION: 
A COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW 37 (K.M. Mittal, 1988) (explaining that double jeopardy receives restric-
tive interpretation in England, Canada, and India in the common law tradition); Erin M. Cranman, 
The Dual Sovereignty Exception to Double Jeopardy: A Champion of Justice or a Violation of a Fun-
damental Right?, 14 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1641, 1649–51 (2000) (explaining that, although double 
jeopardy exists in England and Australia, the rule is more flexible); Nyssa Taylor, England and Aus-
tralia Relax the Double Jeopardy Privilege for Those Convicted of Serious Crimes, 19 TEMP. INT’L & 
COMP. L.J. 189, 192 (2005). 
 307. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice: Identifying Interna-
tional Procedural Protections and Equivalent Protections in National Constitutions, 3 DUKE J. COMP. & 
INT’L L. 235, 288–89 (1993) (“The concept of double jeopardy is interpreted differently by different 
world legal systems . . . . In most continental European nations, however, the state may appeal an ac-
quittal due to errors of law or questions of fact. A conviction may be reversed on appeal and a new 
trial ordered, or the judgment may be revised without remand for a new trial . . . . Furthermore, legal 
systems differ as to when jeopardy attaches.”); Elisabetta Grande, Italian Criminal Justice: Borrowing 
and Resistance, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 227, 256 n.74 (2000) (“In Italy, all parties may appeal the trial court 
decision, no matter if the decision was one of acquittal or of conviction . . . . ”); David S. Rudstein, 
Prosecution Appeals of Court-Ordered Midtrial Acquittals: Permissible Under the Double Jeopardy 
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recent reforms, the prosecutor may apply to the Court of Appeals to re-
try an acquitted person for any of a list of serious offenses if there ap-
pears “new and compelling evidence” and the retrial would be “in the in-
terests of justice.”308 These reforms contain a list of considerations that 
the court is to take into account in judging the matter, including the like-
lihood of a fair trial, the passage of time since the first trial, the likeli-
hood that the new evidence could have been presented in the first trial 
but for prosecutorial error, and the existence of any other prosecutorial 
failure “to act with due diligence or expedition.”309 
Other British Commonwealth countries also have undertaken re-
forms. In 2008, New Zealand created an exception to the double jeop-
ardy bar for offenses whose maximum punishment exceeds fourteen 
years, where the defendant got an acquittal by committing an “admin-
istration of justice” offense—such as perjury, fabricating evidence, or 
corrupting witnesses.310 The Council of Australian Governments permits 
“retrial of the original offence or prosecution for a similar offence where 
the acquittal is ‘tainted,’ . . . ”311 as occurred when Ignatow perjured him-
self at trial. 
In other words, similarly to application of the exclusionary rule, 
other countries are more likely to look at the full set of interests in bal-
ance and make a determination based upon many factors, including as-
sessments of what justice and fairness require. Such an application is rad-
ically different from the United States’ approach of having a fixed rule 
that ignores most interests—such as the seriousness of the offense, the 
extent of the unfairness to the defendant, the defendant’s culpability in 
gaining an earlier false acquittal, and the propriety of the prosecutor’s 
conduct—and favors instead a technical rule applied in a rigid fashion. 
  
                                                                                                                                      
Clause?, 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 91, 94–95 & n.22 (2012) (noting that, although France, Russia, Italy, 
Mexico, and the Netherlands recognize double jeopardy, all generally allow the prosecution to chal-
lenge at least some acquittals by way of appeal). 
 308. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, §§ 78(1), 79(1) (Eng.). 
 309. Id. § 79(2). 
 310. See NEW ZEALAND LAW COMMISSION, REPORT 70: ACQUITTAL FOLLOWING PERVERSION 
OF THE COURSE OF JUSTICE 7–8, 11 (2001), available at http://www.lawcom.govt.nz/project/double-
jeopardy/publication/report/2001/acquittal-following-perversion-course-justice. The changes were ap-
proved by Parliament in 2008. LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF HONG KONG, CONSULTATION PAPER: 
DOUBLE JEOPARDY 3, 43 (2010), available at http://www.gov.hk/en/residents/government/publication/ 
consultation/docs/2010/DoubleJeopardy.pdf; see Diana McCurdy, Verdict of Public Hits the Courts, 
NEW ZEALAND HERALD, June 27, 2004, at B08; Lesley Deverall, Majority Verdicts Get the All-Clear, 
THE DOMINION POST, http://www.stuff.co.nz/dominion-post/news/politics/496239/Majority-verdicts-
get-the-all-clear (last updated June 6, 2008 12:47 AM). 
 311. Double Jeopardy COAG Law Reform Working Group, Double Jeopardy Law Reform: 
Model Agreed by COAG 1 (April 2007), http://www.lccsc.gov.au/agdbasev7wr/sclj/documents/pdf/ 
mcloc_projects_double_jeopardy_coag_model.pdf (COAG Model). 
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3. Statute of Limitations 
 On the evening of March 16, 1978, sixteen-year-old Lauren 
Kustudick went to a local dance club to meet friends for an early St.  
Patrick’s Day party.312 Her friends never arrived, but when a young man 
(later identified as Herbert Howard) approached her to offer a ride 
home, she accepted.313 As another young man drove, Howard jumped in-
to the back seat, cracked Lauren in the face with his fist, and began to 
severely beat her.314 The driver ignored Lauren’s pleas to stop the car.315 
Howard, screaming obscenities and spitting on her, ripped off her clothes 
and forcibly raped her.316 He also choked her, bit her, and burned her 
with a cigarette.317 The beating was so severe it fractured her skull in mul-
tiple places.318 When the driver pulled into a gas station, Lauren fled, 
completely naked, and was found by a Cook County Deputy Sheriff.319 
Lauren was too traumatized to help investigators, but police none-
theless identified Howard as their primary suspect on their own.320  
Howard was later released when Lauren was unable to participate in the 
investigation and prosecution.321 In 1991, Lauren began seeing a rape 
therapist.322 Through therapy, she was able to remember the attack and 
to come to terms with the incident.323 At the urging of her therapist,  
Lauren contacted the police.324 She picked Howard from a book of pho-
tographs as the man who beat and raped her, and her cooperation led po-
lice to confirm other evidence of Howard’s clear guilt.325 
However, Illinois had a five-year statute of limitation for rape, and 
by the time Lauren was able to help police, that limitation period had 
run.326 Howard was immune from prosecution.327 
In another case, in November 1982, in Brooklyn, New York, Donald 
Holloman argued with Herman Turner and another man about the $100 
he was owed for making a car repair.328 When a fight ensued, the un-
                                                                                                                                      
 312. ROBINSON & CAHILL, LAW WITHOUT JUSTICE, supra note 233, at 53; Cook County Sheriff’s 
Police Department Report (Mar. 17, 1978); Interview by Ryan McLennan with Lauren Kustudick in 
Glenview, Illinois (Nov. 28, 2000) (notes on file with author).  
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 328. See People v. Turner, No. 3361-1998, 1998 WL 35307751, *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1998), 
aff’d 281 A.D.2d 568 (N.Y. App. Dir. 2001), vacated, 10 A.D.3d 458 (N.Y. App. Dir. 2004), aff’d, 840 
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armed Holloman picked up a stick and then a bottle, but was shot twice 
by Turner, killing him.329 Police sought Turner for murder, but he fled to 
South Carolina.330 When Turner returned in 1994, witnesses to the killing 
tipped off police, who arrested him.331 He was indicted for second-degree 
murder in 1998, sixteen years after the killing.332 Turner’s attorney sup-
ported giving a jury instruction that allowed conviction for either second-
degree murder or first-degree manslaughter.333 The intermediate man-
slaughter verdict offered the jury a ready compromise to avoid murder, 
which they took.334 What the jury did not know was that Turner would 
then go free because the statute of limitations on manslaughter had run, 
leaving him unpunished for the killing.335 
To the average citizen, the impunity with which Howard could rape 
and Turner could kill is puzzling indeed. The basis for punishment is 
clear. There is no suggestion that the prosecutors or investigators acted 
improperly in any way. It is hard to see that Howard or Turner were se-
riously inconvenienced or disadvantaged by the delay in prosecution—
indeed, they have gotten the undeserved benefit of staying free while 
they should have been in prison. And if the delay had disadvantaged 
them in some way, their due process rights would allow them to chal-
lenge the delay as a violation.336 
The continued justification for fixed statutes of limitations is un-
clear. Some states have essentially eliminated statutes of limitation, with 
no apparent negative consequences.337 Most countries in the world have 
no such fixed limitation period.338 England and Canada for example, rely 
instead upon judicial balancing to assess whether a preindictment delay is 
unwarranted and prejudicial, essentially engaging in a case-by-case fair-
ness assessment.339 
                                                                                                                                      
Old Murder, N.Y. POST, Mar. 28, 1998, at 12, available at 1998 WLNR 6578819; see also; Dan  
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 333. People v. Turner, 10 A.D. 3d at 459. 
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ROBINSON & CAHILL, LAW WITHOUT JUSTICE, supra note 233, at 60–61. 
 339. Powell, supra note 337, at 149.  
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D. Disillusionment and Lost Credibility 
As social psychology studies reveal, reputation is primarily a func-
tion of perceived motivation.340 It is not the failures of justice themselves 
that do the damage, as many of these failures are easily forgiven by a 
community that understands the practical limits of reliably reconstructing 
past events and abhors wrongful convictions and injustice. Doctrines like 
the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof and excluding coerced 
confessions make sense to people even if some guilty offenders may go 
free as a result. What is damaging to a system’s reputation are those in-
stances, like the doctrines of disillusionment noted above, that suggest an 
indifference to the importance of doing justice. Letting offenders who 
are clearly guilty of serious offenses escape punishment for a seemingly 
trivial technicality portrays a system willing to trade justice in order to 
promote an interest that could be promoted in some other way. 
The doctrines of disillusionment have a negative effect. No doubt 
the U.S. criminal justice system has a better reputation than that of many 
countries in the world.341 But its reputation is quite mixed, and could be 
substantially improved with reform. In a 2011 Gallup poll, only twenty-
eight percent said they had a “great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence 
in the U.S. criminal justice system.342 It ranked far below the ratings of 
many other institutions, including organized religion, the military, and 
small business. Even the police ranked dramatically higher. At fifty-
seven percent, the police have more than twice the percentage of people 
expressing a ‘great deal’ or ‘quite a bit’ of confidence in them.343 More-
over, the reduced confidence in the criminal justice system has been con-
sistent over the past two decades during which the polling has been 
done.344 
Part of the disillusionment arises from a common view that the 
courts do not take the importance of doing justice seriously enough. An 
earlier ABA-sponsored nationwide survey found that, when people were 
                                                                                                                                      
 340. Paul Robinson & John Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 496 (1997). 
 341. See, e.g., MARK D. AGRAST ET AL., THE WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT RULE OF LAW INDEX 
2012-2013 at 161, available at http://www.worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/WJP_Index_ 
Report_2012.pdf (noting that in a global survey of ninety-seven countries, the United States ranked 
twenty-sixth in the overall “Criminal Justice” category, which included questions pertaining to the 
efficacy and impartiality of a country’s criminal justice system).  
 342. Lydia Saad, Americans Express Mixed Confidence in Criminal Justice System, GALLUP (July 
11, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/148433/americans-express-mixed-confidence-criminal-justice-
system.aspx. In 1999, the Hearst Corporation authorized a comprehensive national survey, “How the 
Public Views State Courts,” that was coordinated by the National Center for State Courts. NAT’L CTR. 
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knowledge about the courts expressed lower confidence in courts in their community. Id. Forty-two to 
fifty-seven percent of respondents said the slow pace of justice and the complexity of the law contrib-
utes “A Lot” to the cost of going to court. Id. 
 343. Saad, supra note 342. 
 344. Confidence in Institutions Poll, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1597/confidence-
institutions.aspx (last updated Oct. 1, 2014, 12:00 AM).  
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asked whether “[t]he courts let too many criminals go free on technicali-
ties,” seventy-four percent of people agreed or strongly agreed (only six-
teen percent disagreed or strongly disagreed).345 
One can understand how the Supreme Court decisions during the 
Warren Era in the 1960s could have produced this view, including deci-
sions that applied the exclusionary rule in a variety of contexts and intro-
duced the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine.346 One Texas police 
chief captured the mood of many at the time: “It’s the damnedest thing I 
ever heard . . . ”347 President Dwight Eisenhower, who appointed Warren, 
later concluded that making Warren the Chief Justice was a mistake in 
light of Warren’s decisions in criminal cases, which some described as 
“handcuffing police.”348 Many in Congress called for Warren’s impeach-
ment following the Miranda decision, making a similar argument that the 
decision was “handcuffing police” rather than the criminals.349 Truman 
Capote, testifying before a U.S. Senate committee, said: “It seems almost 
unbelievable to me that the police force of one of our major cities is lit-
erally frightened to death to ask the prime suspect a single question for 
fear that their case against him might be jeopardized.”350 It may be no 
surprise, then, that from 1965 to 1994 the percentage of Americans say-
ing the courts were too lenient on criminals rose from forty-seven per-
cent to eighty-five percent.351 
One should not underestimate the significance of such discontent 
from failures of justice. It is not just one more disagreement with a gov-
ernment policy, which is the way the scholarly and intellectual elites 
sometimes view it. For laypersons, failures of justice are deeply disap-
pointing and often even dramatically disturbing. A woman upset by the 
light sentence for her husband’s killer reported it made her “sick to her 
                                                                                                                                      
 345. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PERCEPTIONS OF U.S. JUSTICE SYSTEM 66 (1999), available 
at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/marketresearch/PublicDocuments/per 
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 349. Leo, supra note 348, at 622. 
 350. See George Gallup, 2 to 1 View: Confession Ruling Bad, SALT LAKE TRIB., July 27, 1966, 
available at http://newspaperarchive.com/salt-lake-tribune/1966-07-27/page-7. 
 351. Tom R. Tyler, Public Mistrust of the Law: A Political Perspective, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 847, 851 
tbl.2 (1998) (citing U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1973, at 
146–47 tbls.2.36, 2.37 (Michael J. Hindeland et al. eds., 1973)); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 1981, at 204–05 tbl.2.33 (Timothy J. Flanagan et al. 
eds., 1982); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 1994, 
at 174–75 tbl.2.43 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 1995)); Rostron, supra note 347, at 326–
27. 
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stomach.”352 People shocked by a justice failure have complained it is 
“absolutely unconscionable,”353 it “keeps me up at night,”354 “it’s a traves-
ty,”355 “it’s unbelievable . . . we’re devastated,”356 “it’s insanity.”357 The up-
set over a justice failure may be even more exaggerated for a victim: “I 
will forever live with this shadow.”358 “There’s a sea of emotions I’ve had 
since this happened. . . . I find [the sentence] very insulting.”359 A rape 
victim explained she will “be forever marked” by the crime and the 
case’s “embittering conclusion.”360 
This discontent with the criminal justice system has led neighbor-
hoods to increasingly take up the role of law enforcement for themselves, 
a role that in many respects might better have been left a governmental 
function, as some of the case studies above illustrate.361 The 2000 Nation-
al Crime Prevention Survey estimated that forty-one percent of the U.S. 
population lives in communities covered by neighborhood watch.362 The 
report concludes that, “this makes Neighborhood Watch the largest sin-
gle organized crime-prevention activity in the nation.”363 The degree to 
which private entities have taken over law enforcement in this country is, 
as one writer says,  
[E]xtraordinary . . . . [P]rivate security officers vastly outnumber 
public law enforcement officers, and spending on private security is 
approximately double the spending for public law enforcement. For 
the most part, this growth has all occurred within the past three or 
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four decades—only thirty-five years ago, there were more public 
police officers than private security guards.364 
Another sign of the criminal justice system’s reputational difficulties is 
found in popular culture. Many of the worst failure-of-justice rules were 
introduced in the 1960s and 1970s. Since that time, an entire movie genre 
depicting discontent has blossomed. The doing-justice-where-the-system-
has-failed movie has become a fantasy favorite for Hollywood. Starting 
with the wildly successful 1970s franchises of Charles Bronson’s Death 
Wish and Clint Eastwood’s Dirty Harry, most big name actors have acted 
in a vigilante flick, including Jodie Foster (The Brave One), Gerard  
Butler (Law Abiding Citizen), Kevin Bacon (Death Sentence), Jeremy 
Irons (Fourth Angel), Liam Neeson (Taken series), Denzel Washington 
(Man on Fire), Christian Bale (The Dark Knight series), Robert DeNiro 
(Righteous Kill), and Michael Douglas (Star Chamber), among many 
others.365 
It is not healthy for a society to have an entire entertainment genre 
built around protagonists who are seen as heroes for breaking the law, 
and audiences being thrilled by it. It is rare for these movie protagonists 
to satisfy the requirements for being a moral vigilante (per the rules in 
Section II.B.), but these protagonists are heroes nonetheless. Movie 
writers must pay careful attention to people’s willingness to pay money 
to see a particular movie. Therefore, movie writers tailor their movies to 
their audience’s sensibilities, given that the success of their movie often 
depends upon it. Heroic protagonists must be kept within a range of 
conduct that the public will find admirable. The fact that protagonists are 
admired despite their gross violation of the law reflects the negative pub-
lic sentiment regarding the criminal justice system, as well as criminal 
law, generally. 
E. Conclusion 
The goal in this Part of the essay has been simply to illustrate the 
existence of failure-of-justice doctrines so the reader can appreciate how 
easy it would be for the average person to come to a skeptical view of the 
system’s commitment to justice. Exactly how that balance of interests 
ought to be struck for each doctrine is a project many times larger than 
                                                                                                                                      
 364. Ric Simmons, Private Criminal Justice, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 911, 920–21 (2007). 
 365. See, e.g., Johnny Firecloud, 10 Best Vigilante Films, CRAVE ONLINE (Nov. 18, 2009), 
http://www.craveonline.com/film/articles/142210-10-best-vigilante-films. Note that many of these mov-
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cle—thereby requiring the hero to act, such as Righteous Kill (hero DeNiro must go classic vigilante to 
do justice because frustrated shadow vigilante cops have planted evidence, allowing the guilty to hide 
from justice), The Star Chamber (hero Eastwood takes down vigilante judge Douglas), and Brother-
hood of Justice (Keanu Reeves as head of a high school vigilante group fighting crime, which spins out 
of control—based on the real case discussed in Part IV.A.). 
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this Article. The argument here is not that we ought to sacrifice our civil 
rights and liberties to promote justice, or deny discretion to officials in 
the criminal justice system. On the contrary, it would be highly unattrac-
tive to live in a society without those rights and liberties, or a society that 
tolerated unjust punishment. The only issue here is how those rights and 
liberties are to be protected and how injustice is to be avoided. It is urged 
here that frustrating justice ought to be a matter of last resort, not first, 
as it commonly seems to be. Intentionally frustrating justice is not cost 
free. It has both deontological and practical crime-control costs, which 
ought to be taken into account in formulating how the interests are to be 
protected and advanced. 
Many doctrines promoting nonjustice interests will not, in fact, con-
flict with doing justice. This is the case with all rules and practices that 
touch on reliability in fact-finding, for example. Presumably everyone 
abhors wrongfully convicting the innocent, and anything that creates a 
risk of it. Thus, for example, the exclusion of coerced confessions, repre-
sentation by competent counsel, and an opportunity to put on an effec-
tive defense are not at issue because they promote reliability. The con-
flict here arises only with regard to rules and practices that seek to go 
beyond the accurate fact-finding goal of the criminal justice process to 
promote some interest that seeks to bar liability and punishment despite 
the clear guilt of the offender for a serious offense. 
There is no dispute as to the importance of the interests that com-
monly motivate the failure-of-justice rules and practices. It is important 
for a society to control police search and seizure, to protect the integrity 
of the courts, to limit multiple prosecution attempts, to limit preindict-
ment delay, to control police sting operations, to require speedy trials, to 
enforce plea agreements as negotiated, and to allow the flexibility to in-
dividualize punishment. The argument here is rather that the means by 
which these interests are advanced ought to take account of the costs, 
both deontological and the practical crime-control costs, incurred when 
these interests are promoted by means that intentionally allow serious 
wrongdoing to go unpunished. 
Can limitations on such justice-frustrating doctrines be morally jus-
tified? As John Rawls would have us consider: if one were in the Original 
Position under the Veil of Ignorance, not knowing whether one would 
end up in the world being Larry Eyler or his next victim, how would one 
formulate the rules to properly balance our interests in fairness and ef-
fectiveness in controlling police and prosecutors or in promoting the in-
tegrity of the criminal justice process with our interest in punishing seri-
ous wrongdoing and maintaining the moral credibility of the criminal 
law? In every rule and practice at issue here, it seems likely that the cur-
rent U.S. position would not survive the Rawlsian Original Position. 
Who would support a rule that values Eyler’s twelve hours of inconven-
ient detention over punishing him for torturing and murdering eighteen 
young men with impunity? Who would support a rule that values  
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Ignatow’s peace of mind in being free from prosecution after his perjury-
induced acquittal as more important than punishing him for his torture, 
rape, and murder of Brenda Schaeffer? This is true even when one 
throws onto the scales the interests of other guilty offenders in positions 
similar to Eyler’s and Ignatow’s. 
The absolutist American approach not only regularly produces fail-
ures of justice, but does so without improving the criminal justice sys-
tem’s reputation for protecting human rights. Public perception of the 
fairness of criminal justice in European countries is as favorable, if not 
more favorable than that of the U.S. system. For example, in ten Euro-
pean countries (including the United Kingdom), over eighty percent of 
people surveyed expressed the view that police and courts make fair and 
impartial decisions.366 Contrast that with the United States, where only 
twenty-eight percent of those polled had a “great deal” or “quite a lot” 
of confidence in the U.S. Criminal Justice System.367 The World Justice 
Project’s Rule of Law Index ranked the United States fourteen out of 
sixteen countries in the protection of human rights among the Western 
Europe & North American Regions.368 
A better approach than the absolutist American rules would take 
account of a wide range of factors and consider the larger issues. As not-
ed previously, this is an approach common in European and general in-
ternational practice.369 For instance, foreign courts consider the following: 
was there actually any unfairness to the offender? To what extent was he 
actually disadvantaged? Are there ways to compensate him for any dis-
advantage by means other that frustrating justice? What is the serious-
ness of the offense? What would be the cost to the system’s reputation 
for fairness to not provide a defense? What would be the cost to the sys-
tem’s moral credibility if a clearly blameworthy offender were given a de-
fense? These inquiries seem preferable to the American rule-bound ap-
proach that commonly ignores everything but whether the rule as written 
was technically breached. 
V. SHADOW VIGILANTISM 
The damage created when the system’s doctrines of disillusionment 
inspire vigilante impulses argues for minimizing such effect, for working 
to avoid a reputation for being indifferent to the importance of doing jus-
tice. It suggests a reconsideration of the system’s willingness to so freely 
trade off justice to promote other interests. 
Some people might argue, however, that the need is not so pressing 
because, even if frustrated by the system’s intentional failures of justice, 
people generally will restrain themselves from vigilante action. Most 
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people are law-abiding by natural inclination. In the unusual case where 
vigilantism does occur, follow-up instances can be effectively discouraged 
by the threat of criminal prosecution. Thus, the current level of inten-
tional failures of justice can be maintained, it might be argued, with little 
danger. Whatever public frustration there may be can be deterred by the 
threat of criminal prosecution, or perhaps simply vented by the emotion-
al play of the vigilante fantasies in Hollywood movies, crime fiction, and 
the like. 
But this assumes that the damage of the doctrines of disillusionment 
expresses itself only in explicit vigilante action on the street, what might 
be called “classic vigilantism.” A closer look suggests otherwise. It can 
and does express itself in less obvious and more damaging ways: in low-
level but pervasive resistance to, and subversion of, the criminal justice 
system, an effect that might be called “shadow vigilantism.” 
When people see dramatic failures of justice like the cases above, or 
even when they see a system that in many smaller ways shows an indif-
ference to the importance of doing justice, that disillusionment may be 
taken by some as the moral justification to manipulate the system to 
compel that missing justice. These disillusioned individuals will not form 
a vigilance committee like San Francisco’s or a street patrol like the  
Lavender Panthers’. They will instead resist and subvert the system in 
more hidden ways. 
Perhaps juries will be more willing to ignore their legal instructions 
and substitute their own notions of justice. Perhaps police officers will be 
more inclined to justify lying in court about the circumstances of a 
search—so called “testilying”—as their own form of “playing the game” 
effectively. Truth and justice do not matter, only gamesmanship. Perhaps 
police, prosecutors, and judges will be more inclined to make up their 
own off-the-books investigative and prosecution rules. Perhaps sentenc-
ing judges and parole commissions will be more willing to look to their 
own political or other special interests, or their own idiosyncratic person-
al views rather than to the system’s official rules. Part of the real danger 
is that we cannot know just how much shadow vigilantism society en-
gages in. 
A. Community Complicity in Classic Vigilantism 
To appreciate the potential breadth of shadow vigilantism, consider 
three examples of cases that display community complicity in classic  
vigilantism. 
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1. William Malcolm: Shielding the Killer of an Unpunished Child 
Molester 
In 1981, William Malcolm lived in East London with his wife and 
her two children, a six-year-old stepdaughter and a nine-year-old step-
son.370 He sexually abused both stepchildren on a regular basis.371 During 
the trial, it came to light that he had been abusing his stepdaughter since 
she was three years old.372 Caught and convicted of serial child abuse, 
Malcolm was given a two-year jail term.373 
Malcolm was released in 1984 to return to the same house to resume 
life with the two children whom he had been convicted of abusing.374 Be-
fore the end of the year, Malcolm was again charged with abusing his 
stepchildren, as well as other young victims in the neighborhood, con-
victed, and sent back to jail.375 After being released again, Malcolm lived 
with a girlfriend and her five children.376 Malcolm continued to abuse 
children.377 In one instance, he tracked down a former victim who testi-
fied against him in a previous trial and raped her again.378 He told her 
that she was “asking for it” because she had helped send him to jail.379 
In 1994, Malcolm was once again charged with sexually abusing 
children.380 The charges involved four children, including children who 
were living with Malcolm at the time.381 Among the charges were multi-
ple instances in which children were “tied to a bed and forced to perform 
sex acts.”382 Details of some incidents include Malcolm leaving abused 
children shoeless in a bedroom, with carpet tacks spread on the floor 
outside the room, so he would be alerted to a victim trying to escape.383 It 
was also alleged that Malcolm frequently beat his victims with a belt.384 
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Prior to prosecution for the latest charges, Malcolm underwent a 
psychological evaluation, which determined that he was a sexual psycho-
path.385 The report described him as having pedophile tendencies of a 
“strongly sadistic nature.”386 Social workers suggested that he was “incur-
ably psychopathic and violent.”387 At trial, the judge described the crimes 
as “unspeakable,” but concluded that there could be no trial for the new 
offenses because his earlier offenses made a fair trial impossible.388 The 
judge explained that victims of the offenses could not realistically be ex-
pected to testify without mentioning previous abuse they had suffered 
from him, and such mention would be prejudicial to the defendant.389 
Malcolm was released from custody without restriction.390 
The victims and neighbors were not happy by the court’s refusal to 
even try Malcolm.391 A female victim expressed disbelief: “The judge says 
he is not going to get a fair trial because of his history, but surely it’s that 
history which proves what a dangerous man he is.”392 A male victim com-
plained, “I didn’t have a childhood. I was petrified of him.”393 In court, 
furious cries of “kill the pervert” came from the public gallery.394 After 
being set free, Malcolm received death threats.395 
Malcolm moved to a block of flats in Manor Park that overlooked a 
common area where children frequently played.396 Sharing the apartment 
with him was his current girlfriend and her several children, three of 
whom were under the age of six.397 
Residents of Manor Park were furious when they learned where 
Malcolm lived.398 One neighbor explained, “There was a lot of trouble 
when he first moved here . . . . You can’t do what he did without creating 
an awful lot of enemies.”399 By lying about his background, Malcolm ob-
tained a job across the street from a primary grade school.400 
On February 18, 2000, at around 10 p.m., Malcolm answered the 
door of his flat and was shot in the head with a single bullet.401 Neighbors 
rushed out to see what had happened, and found him lying on the floor 
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still breathing but bleeding profusely.402 An ambulance arrived, but  
Malcolm was pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital.403 
News of Malcolm’s killing was greeted with jubilation.404 As one 
neighbor explained, “I’m quite happy that people like him are out of this 
community. I can understand quite clearly why someone would want to 
have him out of the way.”405 Another neighbor reported, “nobody will 
feel sorry, except maybe his relatives. I was shocked when I heard some-
one had been shot on the doorstep like that, but when I heard it was him 
I was relieved.”406 Malcolm’s brother, Andy, said, “I want to shake hands 
with his killers. . . . He was vermin, I’m glad he is dead . . . . [O]ur entire 
family wants to say how glad we are that Bill is no longer on this earth. 
As far as I’m concerned my brother was lower than the rats in my 
barn.”407 Malcolm’s former stepdaughter, now an adult, who was raped at 
the age of five, was ecstatic when she received news of the killing, saying 
“[h]earing the Animal was dead is the happiest I’ve ever felt.”408 While 
she knew that, as one of his victims, she was a suspect, she insisted that 
she personally was not involved, saying, “[i]t was none of us. [But] I wish 
it had been me who killed him.”409 
This case is not different from others considered previously in this 
Article, in which vigilantes take the law into their own hands when the 
law shows itself unwilling to punish serious wrongdoing. But what hap-
pened next illustrates another dimension of vigilante action. 
It was widely agreed that many neighbors knew who had done the 
killing, and many more had information that would have helped investi-
gators find the killer.410 Yet, no one came forward, and those who were 
interviewed did not provide information.411 Police investigators ques-
tioned many of Malcolm’s former victims and relatives but received little 
help from them or from neighbors.412 The police urged witnesses who had 
seen white males of average height and build leaving the premises after 
the shooting to come forward.413 Although a neighbor’s younger brother 
had been killed by a pedophile in 1994, and despite the neighborhood 
uproar over Malcolm moving there, that neighbor claimed he did not 
know about Malcolm’s criminal past.414 
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Three months after the murder, investigators were no closer to ap-
prehending the killer or killers.415 It was clear that Malcolm’s murder was 
a crime that the neighborhood did not want solved. 
2. Venice, California: Public Silence on Smashing of Drug Gathering 
Place 
 Venice, a neighborhood in Los Angeles, California, was known for 
its two-mile long promenade along the Pacific Ocean. The neighborhood 
had long attracted an eclectic mix of people, including street performers, 
tourists, and sun-worshipers drawn to the boardwalk. A tourist attraction 
during the day, it drew a less respectable crowd at night. A series of 
wooden pagodas with benches along the boardwalk provided tourists and 
neighbors with a welcome place to sit out of the sun, but at night brought 
local gang members who used the locations to deal drugs. 416 
The neighborhood repeatedly appealed to police to deal with the 
drug problem, or at least to remove the pagodas so that the drug dealing 
would move to less public and prominent places, but their pleas had no 
effect.417 One local resident finally took matters into his own hands, 
ramming the structures with his pickup truck until they were destroyed.418 
With the pagodas gone, the drug dealers moved away.419 
Over the objection of residents, the city rebuilt seating and tables, 
this time constructed in concrete.420 The newly installed gathering areas 
were popular with tourists and the local merchants who sold to them but, 
as expected, the drug dealers returned to them at night.421 As a local resi-
dent put it, “once the picnic tables went back in, it re-created the prob-
lem.”422 Although local community members regularly called the police 
to report the drug dealing, the police rarely responded because, in their 
view, there were bigger crime problems elsewhere.423 
Fed up with the lack of police response, local residents decided to 
again take matters into their own hands.424 One weekend in August, 1994, 
a group of residents in ski masks arrived at the site and took sledgeham-
mers to the new benches.425 By the time the sun rose on Monday morn-
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ing, all the tables had been destroyed, to the cheers of a large crowd of 
onlookers.426 Organizers had informed other neighbors that the demoli-
tion was going to occur, so loud demolition noises would not prompt calls 
to police by those unaware of their purpose.427 Ironically, one person had 
called police to report the incident, but the police had ignored the call as 
being of insufficient importance.428 Local drug dealers were unhappy with 
the destruction and that same morning sent their people swarming the 
local apartment buildings demanding to know who had destroyed their 
hangout.429 
The people who demolished the benches justified their actions by 
the refusal of law enforcement to deal with the problem.430 As one of the 
perpetrators described their sledgehammer escapade, “[We’ve] got a 
bunch of nineteen-year-old kids that are running this street . . . . The fear 
is unbelievable . . . . We have the silent approval of the whole communi-
ty. People were cheering—we even had a woman take a few swings.”431 
Another resident explained, “[s]ometimes you have to tear the house up 
to get the rat out . . . . We have complained and complained and com-
plained to the police and they will not stop here . . . . It was intolera-
ble.”432 Others, less enthusiastic about the destruction, nevertheless con-
ceded that “[t]he guys who did this may have some legitimate com-
complaints . . . .”433 
Despite the fact that eighty to ninety people witnessed the demoli-
tion, and one of the perpetrators was interviewed by the press, investiga-
tors could find no one willing to help them with their inquiries.434 As one 
investigator marveled, “[i]t is just amazing to me that there were three or 
four people out there busting up tables and none of the residents saw an-
ything.”435 Because no one in the neighborhood was willing to help, no 
prosecution was ever brought.436 
3. Kevin McElroy: Protecting the Public Killers of the Local Intimidator 
A resident of Skidmore, Missouri, Kevin McElroy was a local thief, 
bully, and sexual predator.437 He rarely held a job but always had plenty 
of money from stealing anything he could get a “fence” to buy.438 He was 
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an active livestock rustler and, as a result, for years Skidmore County 
had the highest incidence of cattle rustling in the state.439 
His sexual preferences were for young girls between the ages of 
twelve and fifteen.440 Married three times, but never faithful, he attracted 
one young girl after another, keeping them compliant first by attention 
and support in this poor rural area, then by intimidation and abuse.441 He 
fathered more than twenty children with different girls.442 
If family or friends of the girl objected, he would respond with in-
timidation.443 In one instance, after hooking-up with a twelve-year-old 
girl in eighth grade, she soon became pregnant and dropped out of 
school.444 Sixteen days after her child was born, she went home to her 
parents to escape McElroy’s regular beatings, but McElroy tracked her 
down and brought her back at gunpoint, beat her, then returned to her 
parents’ house, shot their dog, and burned their house to the ground.445 
Most people were too intimidated to report McElroy to the police, and 
even when they did little happened, perhaps because the police were 
afraid of him too.446 When he was charged with an offense, he would ar-
range for one of his coon-hunting friends to offer a fabricated alibi and 
would intimidate any witnesses.447 In one instance, when a neighbor com-
plained of his trespassing, McElroy shot the man with a shotgun, wound-
ing him.448 The neighbor insisted that charges be filed, but between the 
shooting and the trial McElroy parked outside the man’s house to stare 
at him on nearly one hundred occasions.449 Acquitted after the usual alibi 
testimony, McElroy showed up at the complaining neighbor’s farm and 
shot a rifle at him as he drove his tractor in the field.450 
One episode finally brought things to a head. Some of McElroy’s 
many children visited a local grocery store owned by Louis and Bo  
Bowenkamp, and were accused of stealing.451 After an argument, 
McElroy was refused further service and banned from the store.452 As 
usual, McElroy took an aggressive response, taking up a staring vigil out-
side of the store and outside of the Bowenkamps’ home.453 Also as usual, 
the police refused to do anything.454 When McElroy twice fired a shotgun 
at his house, Bowenkamp insisted on filing a complaint, but nothing was 
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ever done about it.455 McElroy returned two nights later, firing again, 
with the same nonaction by authorities.456 
On July 8, 1980, McElroy confronted Bowenkamp outside his store 
and shot him with a shotgun, hitting him in the neck.457 McElroy was ar-
rested and charged.458 Free while awaiting trial, McElroy continued his 
campaign of intimidation, including threatening a minister and a local 
sheriff who could be witnesses against him.459 
Despite his usual witnesses, who claimed they happened to be driv-
ing by just at the moment that McElroy shot in what they testified was 
self-defense, McElroy was convicted of second-degree assault and sen-
tenced to two years in prison, but released on bail pending appeal.460 A 
hearing to consider revoking his bail was delayed several times.461 When 
McElroy was heard ranting that he would kill the Bowenkamps, the 
townspeople planned a meeting to discuss how to deal with the problem 
and to arrange a watch to protect the Bowenkamps.462 
McElroy heard about the meeting and showed up at a bar nearby.463 
A group of the townspeople, hearing of his presence, went to the bar and 
followed McElroy out when he left.464 By now a group of about forty-five 
people had appeared.465 When McElroy was getting into his truck, a total 
of six shots from multiple directions were fired at McElroy, killing him.466 
Despite the number of witnesses to the killing in broad daylight, no 
one was willing to provide information to investigators, aside from the 
uncorroborated statements of McElroy’s latest wife, who was inside the 
truck at the time of the shooting.467 A state investigation was followed by 
an FBI investigation ordered by the U.S. Department of Justice.468 Nearly 
one hundred interviews of local residents and apparent witnesses turned 
up no one willing to provide information to investigators.469 The case re-
mains unsolved.470 
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B. Manipulating the System to Compel the Justice It Seems Reluctant to 
Impose 
The classic vigilantes in the cases above are doing what we have 
seen throughout Part II: taking the law into their own hands when they 
see gross failures of justice. The new element here is the conduct of the 
neighbors in protecting the classic vigilantes from prosecution. These 
“shadow vigilantes,” as they might be called, are not going out into the 
streets to break the law, as the classic vigilantes do. Their conduct, or 
omission, however, is designed to subvert the law, if not break it. Their 
motivation is likely the same as that of the classic vigilantes: the sense of 
moral justification arising from the system’s willful failures. I put “shad-
ow vigilantes” in quotes above because they are not technically “vigilan-
tes” as I have defined and used the term earlier in this Article. Depend-
ing on the circumstances, the shadow vigilantes’ conduct might be 
criminal or it might be only unethical. It shares a motivation with classic 
vigilantism: to force the criminal justice system to impose the justice that 
the system has up to that point failed to enact. The shadow vigilantes’ ac-
tions might or might not be morally justified (under Part II.B.’s rules), 
but no doubt these people probably think they are justified.471 They likely 
see themselves similarly to how civil disobedience protesters see them-
selves: they know that what they are doing is inconsistent with the law, in 
spirit, if not in letter, but they see the violation as morally justified by the 
law’s own immorality in its indifference to doing justice. 
Shadow vigilantism is in fact more damaging than classic vigilantism 
for several reasons. First, while less dramatic, it is more pervasive. Shad-
ow vigilantism appeals not just to the unusual person or group willing to 
be a classic vigilante by openly breaking the law in serious ways. Rather, 
it appeals to the ordinary people who cannot bring themselves to such 
explicit lawlessness, but who can bring themselves to undermine and 
subvert, through noncooperation, lying, or other lower-level misconduct, 
a system they see as immorally indifferent to serious wrongdoing. Con-
sider all the neighbors in the Section A cases that refused to help author-
ities pursue the classic vigilantes. If those neighbors were sitting on a jury 
for those vigilantes, would they be likely to vote to acquit? If they were 
the grand jurors or prosecutor in the case, would they want to avoid 
bringing charges? If they were voting on a proposal to change the rules 
that led to the failure of justice, would they vote for the change and for a 
politician who supported the change? It seems highly likely that they 
would easily do all of the above. The fact that an entire neighborhood 
can show its willingness to succumb to a shadow vigilante impulse shows 
the potential sweep of the problem. 
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Further, shadow vigilantism is more problematic than the classic 
form because the criminal justice system cannot effectively deter it in the 
way it can classic vigilantism. The failure to report a crime or to assist in-
vestigators often is not considered a crime in the United States472 and 
other low-level shadow vigilantism misconduct, even if it is criminal, can-
not be effectively prosecuted. More on the specific kinds of shadow vigi-
lantism is discussed below. 
But shadow vigilantism is also more damaging because it operates in 
the shadows. The classic vigilantes, by operating openly, serve as a public 
protest against the system’s failures of justice – a call to the system to 
correct itself. Shadow vigilantism is generally unseen. Jury nullification, 
improper exercise of discretion in charging, sentencing and other crimi-
nal justice decisions, and support in the voting booth for unjust punish-
ment policies go unseen. 
Further, the level of shadow vigilante action in any given case is un-
predictable, dependent as it is on a wide variety of factors, such as public-
ity and public reaction. That introduces arbitrariness and disparity 
among cases that can only contribute in the long run to the system’s rep-
utation as being less predictable, more arbitrary, more unreliable, and 
thus less just. In other words, shadow vigilantism only serves to exacer-
bate the system’s moral credibility problem that triggered it. 
Thus, as Section C below explains, the system’s insensitivity to the 
importance of doing justice invites a downward spiral. The system’s poor 
reputation prompts shadow vigilantism, which further degrades the sys-
tem’s consistency and predictability, which further undermines its repu-
tation, making it that much easier for people to be provoked to under-
mine and subvert it. 
Consider the many ways in which shadow vigilantism can manifest 
itself. 
1. Refusing to Report an Offense, Assist an Investigation, or Bring a 
Prosecution 
One form of shadow vigilantism has already been illustrated: the re-
fusal to report offenses, assist investigators, or to testify in court. The 
three Section A cases above show such lack of cooperation in the prose-
cution of classic vigilantes. But the same refusal to cooperate may be 
seen in cases beyond those of protecting vigilantes. Consider, for exam-
ple, cases in which the offender is seen by the community as using defen-
sive force in trying to protect himself or the neighborhood. The shadow 
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vigilante may believe that authorities ought to be providing the protec-
tion and, if they fail, at the very least, the law should do everything to 
help the victims who are forced to defend themselves.473 
Empirical studies show strong support among laypersons for the use 
of defensive force against aggressors and for the excuse of defenders who 
make mistakes in using defensive force.474 The community views on this 
point are dramatically more liberal than the legal rules. For example, a 
summary of studies found that 
In all of these studies, the community judges that these [defensive 
force] justifications are more compelling than the legal codes are 
willing to grant. Respondents frequently assign no liability in cases 
to which the code attaches liability. Even when respondents assign 
liability, they typically assign considerably less punishment than 
would be suggested by codes.475 
The same phenomenon is seen in local prosecutors’ charging decisions. 
Recall, for example, the recent case of George Zimmerman’s killing of 
unarmed teenager Trayvon Martin. Zimmerman, the neighborhood 
watch coordinator, suspected unfamiliar Martin of being a trespasser in 
the gated community.476 He followed Martin and claimed he shot the un-
armed Martin in self-defense.477 The local authorities filed no charges un-
til national press focusing on the racial aspect of the case compelled a 
prosecution.478 
The same dynamic was probably at work in the famous case of the 
New York “subway vigilante,” Bernhard Goetz, who shot four young  
African-American men after he claimed they sought to rob him.479 After 
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e.g., Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41, 50–51 (1959) (finding contempt where a witness refused to 
answer before a grand jury on grounds of self-incrimination privilege despite being granted immunity). 
But see FED. R. CRIM. P. 42 (Criminal Contempt); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4906 (False Reports to Law 
Enforcement Authorities); Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162, 164 (1965) (identifying a similar sce-
nario where criminal contempt was not appropriate). But shadow vigilantes can usually avoid commit-
ting such offenses simply by saying nothing to investigators in the first place and never drawing atten-
tion to themselves that might put them before a grand jury. 
 474. See ROBINSON, INTUITIONS OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 280. 
 475. For anecdotal instances of refusals to press charges by prosecutors or acquittals by juries, see 
Joe Palazzolo & Rob Barry, More Killings Called Self-Defense, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 2012, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303404704577311873214574462.html. The journalists 
cite two cases in Florida: a 2009 shooting in which a robber broke into a club for recovering alcoholics 
and threatened members at gunpoint; a man present in the club shot the robber with a concealed 
weapon, but was ultimately not charged, as local prosecutors claimed he had acted in self-defense. In 
another case in Florida, a judge dismissed a murder charge against an individual who fatally stabbed a 
suspected burglar who had stolen his car radio, because the individual had attempted to swing a bag of 
stolen radios at him. Id. 
 476. Greg Henderson & Scott Neuman, Jury Acquits Zimmerman of All Charges, NPR (July 13, 
2013, 7:45 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2013/07/13/201744637/jury-in-zimmerman-trial-
enters-second-day-of-deliberation. 
 477. Greg Botelho, What Happened the Night Trayvon Martin Died, CNN (May 23, 2012, 10:48 
AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/05/18/justice/florida-teen-shooting-details. 
 478. See id.; Lizette Alvarez & Carey Buckley, Zimmerman is Acquitted in Trayvon Martin Kill-
ing, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/us/george-zimmerman-verdict-
trayvon-martin.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 479. See People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41 (N.Y. 1986). 
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a first round of shots that scattered the four, Goetz approached Darrell 
Cabey, who was grasping a seat by the conductor’s cab, and said, “You 
seem to be doing alright. Here’s another.”480 He then shot Cabey, sever-
ing his spine.481 When first presented the case, the grand jury refused to 
indict.482 
2. Jury Nullification to Counter the Law’s Apparent Indifference to 
Punishing Unlawful Aggressors 
The same shadow vigilantism operates later in the system as well, 
when cases go to trial. When Zimmerman was finally charged with the 
killing of Martin, an all-woman jury acquitted him of all homicide  
charges.483 In the Goetz case, publicity centering on the racial component 
of the case eventually brought a resubmission to the grand jury and a  
trial.484 While it seems difficult to see how a jury could conclude that 
Goetz could “reasonably believe” shooting Cabey was necessary to pro-
tect himself, as the self-defense statute required, the jury acquitted Goetz 
of all assault charges.485 The law has its rules, but shadow vigilantes with 
the power of jury nullification have their own. 
In a Minot, North Dakota, case, four men came to Jeremiah  
Tallman’s home to complain of a theft they claimed occurred earlier in 
the day.486 They exchanged angry words with Tallman while standing in 
the entryway.487 They were told to leave, and did when Tallman cocked 
the slide of his gun.488 As they walked away, one pounded on the trailer 
and another broke a window.489 Tallman then shot one of the men in the 
back several times, killing him.490 He was acquitted of all homicide and 
assault charges.491 
                                                                                                                                      
 480. Id. at 43; Jack Strickland, Bernhard Goetz: “You Seem To Be Doing Alright, Here’s  
Another,” YOUTUBE.COM (July 3, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xXtEle8JM2w. 
 481. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d at 43. 
 482. Grand Jury Refuses to Indict Goetz for Attempted Murder, GADSDEN TIMES, Jan. 26, 1985, at 
A8.  
 483. See Henderson & Neuman, supra note 476. 
 484. See Goetz, 497 N.E.2d at 45. 
 485. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15; Jon Beeman & Evan Lange, The Bernhard Goetz Trial: A 
Chronology, UNIV. MO. KAN. CITY LAW SCH. http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/goetz/ 
goetzchrono.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2014). 
 486. Dave Caldwell, Jury Decides Minot Man’s Actions Were Self-Defense, MINOT DAILY NEWS, 
May 25, 2011, http://www.minotdailynews.com/page/content.detail/id/555056/Jury-decides-Minot-man-
s-actions-were-self-defense.html?nav=5010. 
 487. Id. 
 488. Id. 
 489. Id. 
 490. Minot Murder Suspect Jeremiah Tallman Pleads Not Guilty, BISMARCK TRIBUNE, Aug. 26, 
2010, http://bismarcktribune.com/news/state-and-regional/minot-murder-suspect-jeremiah-tallman-
pleads-not-guilty/article_a45f7f0c-b11f-11df-bb5d-001cc4c03286.html. 
 491. PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY & BLAME: COMMUNITY 
VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 80 (1995) (“Our subjects may believe that the criminal justice system 
is not likely to apprehend criminals, convict them when it apprehends them, or justly punish them 
when it convicts them. Our subjects may also believe that the criminal justice system is failing in its 
role of protecting citizens. Our discrepant results may stem from a general belief that when the crimi-
nal justice system does a poor job in punishing offenders, it is appropriate for individual citizens to do 
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According to one study, if self-defense is raised at trial, it succeeds 
much more often than any other kind of defense.492 The survey respond-
ents, consisting of judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys, estimated 
that the defense succeeded seventy-six percent, forty-seven percent, and 
forty-six percent of the time, respectively.493 
The same dynamic can apply to not just defensive force cases but al-
so to cases in which the police are using aggressive force. Recall the 1991 
case in which the police stopped an under-the-influence Rodney King af-
ter a long car chase and seriously beat him to subdue him.494 The grue-
some and excessive beating was caught on videotape, yet the Ventura 
County jury acquitted the officers.495 Some of the jurors may well have 
thought that the police conduct was in violation of existing law. These ju-
rors may have felt morally justified in acquitting the officers because they 
lacked confidence that existing law took proper account of the need for 
the use of force or gave sufficient deference to the ease of error in such 
situations.496 
According to a Cato Institute study, prosecution, imprisonment, and 
other sanctions of police officers occur at a much lower rate than for ci-
vilians facing similar charges.497 In some cases, according to the Cato da-
ta, officers were acquitted even in the face of clear evidence, such as mul-
tiple witnesses or videotape.498 For example, in September 2009, a  
Spokane, Washington, jury acquitted an officer of assault for kicking a 
suspect in the face, though other officers present confirmed that he had 
done so.499 In another Washington State incident in 2010, an officer was 
acquitted after he was videotaped striking a fifteen-year-old girl who, 
                                                                                                                                      
more in defense of both self and property as well as in law enforcement. The more ineffective the sys-
tem is seen to be, the more people may be willling to let victims take matters into their own hands. . . . 
The strength of the differences between community standards and legal codes that we found would 
indicate, at a minimum, that large segments of the population are deeply dissatisfied with the criminal 
justice system. These observed discrepancies may illustrate one of the “hidden costs” to policies that 
fail to provide adequately funded police forces, or to court systems that fail to punish blameworthy 
offenders.”). 
 492. Neil P. Cohen et al., The Prevalence and Use of Criminal Defenses: A Preliminary Study, 60 
TENN. L. REV. 957, 973 tbl.2 (1993). 
 493. Id. at 975 tbl.4.  
 494. Emily Langer, Rodney King Dies; Victim of Police L.A. Beating Was 47, WASH. POST, June 
17, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/rodney-king-dies-victim-of-police-la-beating-was-
47/2012/06/17/gJQAVSh2jV_story.html. 
 495. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar & Jonathan L. Marcus, Double Jeopardy Law After Rodney 
King, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2 (1995). Again, national media attention driven by public unrest in some 
minority neighborhoods compelled a later trial in federal court in which two defendants were con-
victed of violating King’s civil rights. Id. 
 496. The empirical studies similarly suggest great leniency toward citizens exercising law en-
forcement authority, even when they make mistakes in the use of force. ROBINSON, INTUITIONS OF 
JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 293–99. 
 497. See CATO INSTITUTE, NATIONAL POLICE MISCONDUCT REPORTING PROJECT, 2010 ANNUAL 
REPORT, available at http://www.policemisconduct.net/statistics/2010-annual-report/. 
 498. See David Packman, The Problem with Prosecuting Police in Washington State, CATO 
INSTITUTE (FEB. 27, 2011, 12:55 AM), http://www.policemisconduct.net/the-problem-with-prosecuting-
police-in-washington-state/. 
 499. Thomas Clouse, Jury Acquits Spokane Officer, SPOKESMAN-REVIEW, Sept. 10, 2009, http:// 
www.spokesman.com/stories/2009/sep/10/jury-finds-officer-not-guilty-assault/.  
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when told to remove her basketball shoes, kicked toward a fellow depu-
ty.500 The first trial resulted in a hung jury, while the second resulted in an 
acquittal.501 
3. Neighborhood Watch and Beyond 
The shadow vigilante attitude also shows itself in the dramatic rise 
in neighborhood watch and private security organizations, as noted in 
Part IV.D. Thirty-five years ago there were more police than private se-
curity, while today there is twice as much spending on private law en-
forcement than public.502 It is a literal, and usually lawful, form of the 
neighborhood taking on the role of the government, which has, in the 
community’s view, proven itself inadequate to the task.503 But we know 
from the Maccabees’ case study, as well as the Zimmerman case, that 
such citizen involvement in policing can easily end in conflict and vio-
lence, or in simply displacing crime from one neighborhood to another. 
Some neighborhoods have gone beyond watch groups. A recent de-
velopment is the “Glock Block,” where neighborhoods in Oregon, Texas, 
and Arizona advertise “We Don’t Call the Police.”504 The threat itself 
may not be illegal, but it certainly signals a willingness to go far beyond 
the rules of lawful defensive conduct. 
This kind of community action, at least of the tamer neighborhood 
watch variety, is consistent with the commonly-applauded trend in crimi-
nal justice toward greater community participation. At the trial and pun-
ishment phase, restorative justice has become extremely popular and has 
a broad political spectrum of supporters. Even community involvement 
in prosecution decisions, and what has been called “community prosecu-
tion” has gained support.505 Community involvement in most aspects of 
criminal justice is on the rise, and the underlying shadow vigilante im-
pulse will have an increasing number of ways to express itself. 
                                                                                                                                      
 500. Scott Sunde, No Third Trial for Ex-Deputy Accused of Jail Assault, SEATTLE PI (July 8, 
2010), http://www.seattlepi.com/local/article/No-third-trial-for-ex-deputy-accused-of-jail-886478.php. 
 501. Id. 
 502. See supra text accompanying note 364. 
 503. It seems unlikely that watch groups are formed in neighborhoods content with their law en-
forcement situation. See, e.g., ROBINSON, INTUITIONS OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 155.  
 504. Citizens Band Together to Form “Glock Block” Saying “We Don’t Call the Police,” 
MR.CONSERVATIVE.COM (June 18, 2013, 8:25 PM), http://www.mrconservative.com/2013/06/19406-
citizens-band-together-to-form-glock-block-saying-we-don’t-call-the-police/; Anna Sanders, Welcome 
to the ‘Glock Block’: Vigilante Neighbors in Oregon Town Say They Are No Longer Calling the Police 
and Have Armed Themselves Instead, MAILONLINE.COM (June 17, 2013, 5:54 PM), http://www. 
dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2343491/Welcome-Glock-Block-Vigilante-neighbors-Oregon-town-say-
longer-calling-police-armed-instead.html.  
 505. Nicholas W. Klitzing, Fixing the Unfixable: Community Prosecution as a Problem-Solving 
Strategy to Reduce Crime and Restore Order in East St. Louis, 32 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 157, 158 
(2012). 
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4. Morally Justifying Police “Testilying”  
Another form of shadow vigilantism is police officers morally justi-
fying their lying in court to compensate for what they see as improper 
rules that regularly lead to failures of justice—complex rules that have 
“metastasized into a dizzying array of formalistic doctrines and subdoc-
trines.”506 Even police officials concede that police lying in court, espe-
cially to justify improper searches, is not uncommon.507 It has earned its 
own label, “testilying.” The term was coined by New York City police of-
ficers, apparently to help them justify in their own minds why it was dif-
ferent from normal lying under oath—even if not legal, it was morally 
justified.508 “When an officer is deceptive in court, the rationale goes, he 
is ‘not quite lying’ but ‘not quite testifying truthfully and completely’ ei-
ther. Testilying is seen as a middle ground between pure honesty and 
pure dishonesty.”509 
Most famous among the examinations of police perjury is the 1994 
Mollen Commission Report on the New York Police Department: “Po-
lice perjury and falsification is a serious problem facing the Department 
and the criminal justice system.”510 Such perjury was “probably the most 
common form of police corruption . . . particularly in connection with ar-
rests for possession of narcotics and guns.”511 An empirical study by  
Orfield in Chicago concluded that “[v]irtually all the officers admit that 
the police commit perjury, if infrequently, at suppression hearings.”512 
The study claimed that up to seventy-six percent of the officers surveyed 
had “shaded” facts in order to establish probable cause.513 
The Mollen Commission Report spoke to the reasons for the offic-
ers’ willingness to lie: “In their view, regardless of the legality of the ar-
rest, the defendant is in fact guilty and ought to be arrested.”514 It ex-
plained that the officers were frustrated with the legal rules that 
                                                                                                                                      
 506. George C. Thomas III, Lost in the Fog of Miranda, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 1501, 1501 (2013). 
 507. Michelle Alexander, Op-Ed., Why Police Lie Under Oath, N.Y. TIMES SUNDAY REV. (Feb. 
2, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/03/opinion/sunday/why-police-officers-lie-under-oath.html? 
pagewanted=all&_r=0 (quoting Peter Keane, former San Francisco Police commissioner: “[p]olice 
officer perjury in court to justify illegal dope searches is commonplace. One of the dirty little not-so-
secret secrets of the criminal justice system is undercover narcotics officers intentionally lying under 
oath. It is a perversion of the American justice system that strikes directly at the rule of law. Yet it is 
the routine way of doing business in courtrooms everywhere in America”). 
 508. Larry Cunningham, Taking on Testilying: The Prosecutor’s Response to In-Court Police De-
ception, 18 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 26, 26 (1999). 
 509. Id. 
 510. COMMISSION REPORT, THE CITY OF NEW YORK COMM’N TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS 
OF POLICE CORRUPTION AND THE ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE DEP’T 36 (1994) 
[hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT], available at http://www.parc.info/client_files/special%20Reports/ 
4%20-%20Mollen%20Commission%20-%20NYPD.pdf.  
 511. Id. 
 512. Myron W. Orfield, Jr., The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An Empirical Study of Chica-
go Narcotics Officers, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1016, 1051 (1987).  
 513. Jon Loevy, Truth or Consequences: Police “Testilying,” 36 Litig. 13, 14 (2010) (citing Myron 
W. Orfield, Jr., The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An Empirical Study of Chicago Narcotics Of-
ficers, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1016 (1987)). 
 514. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 510, at 38. 
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protected criminals from search and seizure, because the rules were per-
ceived as “unrealistic rules of law.”515 Officers also expressed frustration 
in their “inability to stem the crime in their precinct through legal 
means.”516 They have a strong belief that perjury was acceptable because 
it was necessary to stem the tide of crime, and such was “‘doing God’s 
work’—doing whatever it takes to get a suspected criminal off the 
streets.”517 
Other writers have made the same point: “Police view perjury as a 
necessary means to achieve the ends of justice. Constitutional rules—
particularly the Exclusionary Rule—are viewed as technicalities that ‘let 
the criminal . . . go free because the constable has blundered.’”518 One 
study found that testilying began soon after cases were dismissed under 
the 1961 exclusionary rule holding in Mapp v. Ohio.519 To police, “there is 
a deep-seated disregard for what they consider to be silly little laws made 
by a silly little Supreme Court in a backroom far removed from the dan-
gerous streets they are trying to bring into order.”520 
Presumably judges, like others in the system, are well aware of the 
“testilying.” Yet some may share the shadow vigilante sympathy, and 
thus, while no doubt unhappy about perjury in their court, play along 
with the game and accept the testimony as sufficient to justify the search 
or the arrest. As Alan Dershowitz reports, when officers offer perjured 
testimony, the judge “shakes his head in knowing frustration, but accepts 
the officers’ account as credible.”521 
This is a sad state of affairs. But, in some ways it is a predictable de-
velopment as the collection of outrageous results from the law’s “techni-
calities” accumulate (as in Eyler, Ignatow, Healy, and other cases in Part 
IV.). As the law increasingly loses moral credibility with the community, 
it becomes increasingly easier for shadow vigilantes to justify the subver-
sion of what they see as an immoral system. It is probably no coincidence 
that “testilying” is most frequently associated with satisfying the techni-
calities of search and seizure law. The same officer who feels comfortable 
lying about which side of a house’s threshold he was on when he saw 
drugs in plain sight might think it abhorrent to lie about a matter related 
to the actual guilt or innocence of the defendant. 
                                                                                                                                      
 515. Id. 
 516. Id.  
 517. WAYNE PETHRICK ET AL., FORENSIC CRIMINOLOGY 118 (2010). 
 518. Cunningham, supra note 508, at 29. 
 519. Case Comment, Effect of Mapp v. Ohio on Police Search and Seizure Procedures in Narcotics 
Cases, 4 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 87, 94–95 (1968). 
 520. Nick Malinowski, Testilying: Cops Are Liars Who Get Away With Perjury, VICE (Feb. 3, 
2013), www.vice.com/read/testilying-cops-are-liars-who-get-away-with-perjury. 
 521. Alan Dershowitz, Op-Ed., A Police Badge is Not a License to Commit Perjury, EVENING 
TRIB., Apr. 4, 1991, at B11. 
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5. Prosecutorial Overcharging 
Another instance of shadow vigilantism, in which participants feel 
morally justified in subverting the system in order to do justice, is the 
now common practice of prosecutorial overcharging. The overcharging is 
of two sorts: vertical overcharging, in which the prosecutor charges of-
fenses for which he has insufficient proof to convict, and horizontal over-
charging, in which he charges a series of overlapping offenses arising 
from the same criminal act.522 In the latter type, prosecutors charge every 
offense for which a defendant might theoretically satisfy the offense def-
inition, no matter how overlapping the offenses may be. Thus, a prosecu-
tor might take a standard rape case—using force to compel intercourse—
and add on “assault, kidnapping, gross sexual imposition, etc.”523 This is 
made possible because most U.S. criminal codes, even those recodified in 
the Model Penal Code wave, now have a vast collection of overlapping 
offenses,524 as legislatures have been constantly adding new offenses, 
sometimes making the code seven or eight times longer than its original 
Model-Penal-Code-based form, but without substantially expanding its 
coverage.525 
                                                                                                                                      
 522. Kyle Graham, Overcharging, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 701, 704 (2014). 
 523. Anon. 2.71828, Comment to “Overcharging,” SENTENCING LAW AND POLICY (Mar. 19, 2013, 
10:45 PM), http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2013/03/overcharging.html.  
 524. For example, in the Illinois criminal code: 
Chapter 720 includes narrow, specific offenses in addition to a broader prohibition against such 
conduct generally. For example, although one provision in current Chapter 720 covers theft gen-
erally, a number of other provisions in Chapter 720 prohibit the same underlying conduct — theft 
by taking (or its attempt)—in the context of specific circumstances or forms of property. The 
same situation exists for assault offenses and property damage offenses. Similarly, in addition to 
its general perjury offense, current Illinois law contains numerous offenses criminalizing false 
statements made under oath or affirmation about particular matters, in particular documents, and 
in particular proceedings.  
MICHAEL T CAHILL & PAUL H. Robinson, FINAL REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS CRIMINAL CODE 
REWRITE AND REFORM COMMISSION xli (2003) [hereinafter CAHILL & ROBINSON, FINAL REPORT] 
(emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted). Kirk Dillard, a Republican state senator from Hinsdale, 
and a member of a later commission, acknowledged that lawmakers sometimes push for redundant 
measures in response to crimes within their districts. Dillard states, “When something occurs in any of 
the members of the General Assembly’s district in a criminal matter . . . the legislator always wants to 
add a new [law] for a lot of reasons, including public-relation’s purposes . . . . [W]e all add to the crimi-
nal code. And it turns into a hodge-podge.” John Chase, Panel to Take on Crime Law Maze, CHI. 
TRIB., Dec. 14, 2004, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2004-12-14/news/0412140287_1_laws-criminal-
code-divito. 
 525. See CAHILL & ROBINSON, FINAL REPORT, supra note 524, at xix (“The sheer verbiage of 
current law is one indication of its failure to consolidate similar offenses . . . . Overall, the Proposed 
Code’s Special Part uses only 14.9 percent—less than 1/6—of the words in the current code’s Special 
Part, and only 6.7 percent—about 1/15—of the current Special Part plus other, non-criminal code stat-
utory felonies.”); PAUL H. Robinson, FINAL REPORT OF THE KENTUCKY PENAL CODE REVISION 
PROJECT xxix (2003) (“[N]early three decades of piecemeal modification of the Code have led to the 
addition of hundreds of new offenses, many of which cover the same conduct as previous offenses.”); 
see also Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, The Accelerating Degradation of American Criminal 
Codes, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 633, 635–636 (2005) [hereinafter Robinson & Cahill, Accelerating Degrada-
tion] (“One might expect that over time, as more loopholes or omissions in a code are eliminated, 
there would be a reduced need to alter or expand that code, but historical trends demonstrate that the 
opposite is true . . . the Illinois Code underwent nearly twice as many amendments in its second twenty 
years of existence than in its first twenty years.”). 
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The forest of overlapping offenses exists in large part because pros-
ecutors have politically promoted them. They do so by supporting a con-
stant stream of new offenses that typically are just added on top of the 
old, and by opposing criminal code reforms that would streamline codes 
and eliminate unnecessary overlaps. For example, the political opposi-
tion of prosecutors effectively blocked attempts at a new criminal law 
codification in Illinois in 2003.526 One of the primary aims of this new cod-
ification was the consolidation of overlapping offenses.527 In turn, Illinois 
prosecutors sponsored a new reform commission that would keep the re-
dundancies in the current code.528 
Prosecutors’ moral justification for such excessive charging might 
rest on any or all of several different claims, analogous to the sorts of 
claims heard from police to justify their testilying. First, the criminal jus-
tice process has so many barriers to an offender getting the liability and 
punishment he deserves that such excess is needed just to end up with 
some punishment that approximates what is really deserved.529 Further, 
to some it may make sense to try to get more liability and punishment 
than an offender deserves for the case at hand because, given the gross 
ineffectiveness of the system, the offense at hand is probably just the tip 
of the iceberg of the offenses he has actually committed.530 
Finally, even if the overcharging generates liability that is unde-
served for both present and unpunished past offenses, it is not something 
                                                                                                                                      
 526. Joseph Birkett, the most vocal prosecutor opposing the Criminal Code Rewrite and Reform 
Commission (“CCRRC”) work, contended that “many of the special provisions and enhanced penal-
ties are needed.” John Patterson, Are We Too Tough on Crime? Politicians’ Fear of Appearing Soft 
Creates Avalanche of Laws, CHI. DAILY HERALD, Apr. 1, 2001, available at 2001 WLNR 12161363. A 
Republican member of the Illinois House of Representatives and a member of the CLEAR commis-
sion (the prosecutor-sponsored successor to the original CCRRC), James B. Durkin, has acknowl-
edged that prosecutors are hesitant to change. See Rep. James B. Durkin, Commentary, Court Reform, 
CHI. TRIB., June 27, 2000, at 12, available at 2000 WLNR 8231128. Gino DiVito, a former Illinois ap-
pellate judge who co-chaired the CLEAR commission, found that the code’s illogic stems from laws 
passed to address a specific crime or a constituent complaint, without examining how the new law fits 
within the overall state code. “[T]he code reform project had barely gotten off the ground when prose-
cutors expressed their opposition and were unwilling to devote manpower or resources to assist in the 
project, even though their participation would have assured them a voice within the decision-making 
group.” Robinson & Cahill, Accelerating Degradation, supra note 525, at 649. 
 527. The Commission’s Report explained that  
[T]he drafters have aimed to consolidate offenses. Perhaps inevitably, four decades of piecemeal 
modification of the 1961 Code have led to the addition of hundreds of new offenses, many of 
which cover the same conduct as previous offenses or appear in various other chapters of the  
Illinois Compiled Statutes rather than in the criminal code.  
CAHILL & ROBINSON, FINAL REPORT, supra note 524, at v–vi.  
 528. The 1100-page bill emanating from the Criminal Law Edit, Alignment and Reform 
(“CLEAR”) Commission, inter alia, declined to recommend narrowing the number of circumstances 
that can activate the charge of aggravated battery. They also declined to eliminate anachronistic of-
fenses such as adultery and fornication. The last successful prosecution for fornication occurred in 
1913, while the last charge of adultery brought in criminal court was in the early 1960s. Mike Ramsey, 
Panel Assaults State Criminal Code, COPLEY NEWS SERV., Dec. 29, 2006.  
 529. Graham, supra at note 522, at 713–16. 
 530. See, e.g., Gerald Leonard & Christine Dieter, Punishment Without Conviction: Controlling 
the Use of Unconvicted Conduct in Federal Sentencing, 17 BERKLEY J. CRIM. L. 260 (2012); Al Capone 
Was Sent to Prison, But Still Beat the Courts: A 1931 Editorial on His Conviction for Tax Evasion, NEW 
REPUBLIC, January 17, 2014, available at http://www.newrepublic.com/article/116246/al-capone-1931-
prison-conviction-tax-evasion. 
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that ought to be a concern to prosecutors because the criminal justice 
system is no longer about justice. It is simply a system of mutual combat 
between defense counsel and prosecutors, with winners and losers, the 
goal of which is always to win and never to lose. Just as defense counsel 
see their job as always getting the least punishment possible for their 
guilty clients, the prosecutors, in a symmetrical fashion, should see their 
job as getting as much punishment as they can for guilty defendants.531 
To those unfamiliar with the system, strategic overcharging might 
seem too unethical to be done openly. But the increasing game-like fea-
tures of the system have dulled participants’ sensibilities. Indeed, one 
need only look at similar manipulative conduct by esteemed federal 
judges before the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 stopped the practice. 
Existing federal law at the time required that all offenses be eligible for 
release by the U.S. Parole Commission immediately upon arrival at pris-
on, but federal judges were authorized by statute to delay eligibility until 
an offender had served one-third of his sentence.532 But judges who bri-
dled at this early release could, and did, short-circuit the system by simp-
ly determining the sentence they really wanted, then tripling it.533 Thus, 
the offender would become eligible for release only after serving the full 
term the judge thought appropriate. Prosecutors may be making similar 
sorts of strategic manipulations when they overcharge.534 
6. Voting for Disproportionate Criminal Penalties 
The impulse to subvert or manipulate a system that is thought to 
have lost sight of the importance of doing justice manifests itself in the 
many ways described above. It is also seen in an even larger form: 
providing popular support for criminal justice reforms that would force 
justice from a sometimes reluctant system. Unfortunately, these sorts of 
jury-rigged attempts can produce their own problems and complications. 
Consider, for example, the public dissatisfaction with the kind of 
improperly lenient sentencing illustrated in Part IV.A, such as the fine 
and community service for a shopkeeper who shot the customer in the 
back after wrongly accusing her of shoplifting, and a fine for the men 
                                                                                                                                      
 531. Richard A. Oppel Jr., Sentencing Shift Gives New Leverage to Prosecutors, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
25, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/26/us/tough-sentences-help-prosecutors-push-for-plea-
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commission will do, undoubtedly are tempted to sentence a defendant on the basis of when they be-
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other judges impose sentences consistent with or below the guidelines in order to retain control over 
the release date.”). 
 534. It was in part this judicial manipulative practice that contributed to the enactment of the 
“truth-in-sentencing” provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. 18 U.S.C. § 3551. People had 
become increasingly skeptical of the sentences that were publicly imposed because they always ended 
in early release. The new Act required that an offender serve at least eighty-five percent of the sen-
tence imposed – an attempt to earn back some credibility for the system. Id. 
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who hunted down their victim after a bar confrontation and beat him to 
death with a baseball bat.535 
Dissatisfaction with unduly lenient sentencing helped nurture the 
mandatory minimum movement. It took hold during the 1960s, when 
drug and crime rates were rising,536 yet sentencing discretion remained 
unrestrained.537 Once begun, it took on substantial momentum. For ex-
ample, from 1991 to 2011, the number of the mandatory minimum penal-
ties in the federal code nearly doubled.538 More than two-thirds of the 
states now have mandatory minimums for drug offenses.539 “[M]ore than 
eighty percent of the increase in prison population between 1985 and 
1995 was due to drug convictions that triggered statutory mandatory min-
imum sentences.”540 
The problem is that the shift to mandatory minimums essentially 
guarantees the regular and predictable imposition of sentences that are 
unjust, some grossly so. For example, one recent study of laypersons’ 
shared intentions of justice showed the dramatic conflict between the 
law’s application in real cases and the average person’s judgments about 
those cases.541 In one “three strikes” case, the subjects gave 3.1 years; in 
reality, the court was required to give life imprisonment.542 In a cocaine 
case, subjects gave 4.2 years, while the court was obliged to give life 
without parole.543 In a marijuana case, the subjects gave 1.9 years, while 
the court was compelled to give eight years.544 The unfortunate irony here 
is that even the lay public—who elected the politicians who put the sen-
tencing rules in place—sees these cases as grossly unjust.545 
Everyone—offenders and public alike—would have been better off 
if this sentencing war had never begun, if sentencing judges had re-
strained themselves from giving sentences that seriously conflicted with 
community notions of justice, or if the system had restrained the lenient-
sentencing judges in more thoughtful ways, as with sentencing guidelines. 
To be fair to the judges of that period, some of the improperly leni-
ent sentencing was a product of theories of rehabilitation or other non-
desert goals that were influential at the time. The sentencing policy land-
scape has changed. In the only amendment to the Model Penal Code 
                                                                                                                                      
 535. See supra notes 189–206 and accompanying text. 
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1979–94. 
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since its enactment in 1962, the American Law Institute in 2007 dramati-
cally altered the sentencing purposes provision of the Model Code to set 
desert as the dominant purpose, which can never be violated.546 That new 
clarity of purpose, together with the use of carefully constructed sentenc-
ing guidelines, can avoid the problem of improperly lenient sentences 
and thereby eliminate the need for mandatory minimum sentences. 
The problem is, however, that we now have mandatory minimums 
and, as unnecessary as they may be, getting rid of them will not be easy. 
We will for some time be paying for past sins of doctrines that produced 
predictable failures of justice. At very least, we can stop making things 
worse and begin to repair the system’s moral credibility by having the 
system publicly and persuasively commit itself to doing justice and for-
saking trading it away unnecessarily for minor benefits. 
Some people may argue that the outrageous justice-failures illus-
trated in Part IV do not happen frequently enough to have a significant 
effect on public perceptions. But this misunderstands the dynamic at 
work. First, in many instances, failures of justice do not occur specifically 
because shadow vigilantes are subverting the system. For example, the 
rampant “testilying” by police, with the common acquiescence of judges, 
is aimed at and presumably successful in avoiding failures of justice. This 
is especially true in serious cases where the failure would be spectacular, 
since it is these cases in particular where the shadow vigilante impulse 
will be at its greatest. Interestingly, then, it is shadow vigilantism that in 
some ways may be saving some of these doctrines from themselves, by 
taking the edge off the credibility loss that the system would otherwise 
suffer were they not subverted. 
Second, it is worth repeating social psychology’s insight that motiva-
tion is everything in setting a reputation.547 All that is needed to provoke 
the shadow vigilante’s conclusion that the system is indifferent to the im-
portance of doing justice is an occasional headline case in which such ap-
parent indifference is shown. The outrageous failure occurs, yet there is 
no indication that the judge or some other official is to be sanctioned for 
causing it. Thus it becomes clear that the outrageous result is authorized 
and approved—it is how the system is supposed to work. With the sys-
tem’s apparent indifference established, the observer can then easily as-
sume that the same indifference motivates the system’s decisions in the 
many other cases about which the observer never hears the details. 
Finally, and most importantly, it is not the failure of justice itself 
that does the most serious damage, but rather the threat of it, for this is 
what creates the shadow vigilante impulse. That is, it is the potential of a 
doctrine to produce gross failures that calls for its subversion. The police 
would still engage in testilying to avoid a failure of justice even if they had 
been successful in avoiding such a failure in every instance in the past. It is 
                                                                                                                                      
 546. Paul H. Robinson et al., Empirical Desert, supra note 2, at 34 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE: 
SENTENCING § 1.02(2)(a) (approved May 16, 2007)). 
 547. See supra text accompanying note 340. 
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not the frequency of an outrage that is relevant—each is just an instance 
of the failure to prevent it through subversion—but rather the perceived 
threat of the outrage. If the threat exists, so will the impulse to prevent it. 
C. Blowback and the Downward Spiral 
Unfortunately, the distortions of the criminal justice system inspired 
by the shadow vigilante impulse, such as police “testilying” and injustice-
guaranteeing mandatory minimums, are only the first act of this sad trag-
edy of the system’s lost credibility. The defendants in drug cases, and 
others present in the courtroom, obviously know the police are regularly 
lying in court. Once that practice becomes common knowledge in an ar-
ea, one could reasonably expect that people would stop trusting the po-
lice and the courts. A community that sees a significant portion of its 
young men sent to prison for long terms by mandatory minimums far be-
yond what even the larger community thinks is just punishment548 could 
easily see the criminal justice system as an enemy to be subverted, rather 
than an institution worth supporting and helping. 
One way in which this discontent plays itself out is through move-
ments like “Stop Snitchin’,” which encourages people not to assist or co-
operate with police.549 In some places the movement goes further, to urge 
the intimidation of people who might think of cooperating with authori-
ties. “Snitches Get Stitches,” the saying goes.550 The antisnitch campaign 
has been boosted and glorified by popular music and culture. 
Originally mentioned in rap lyrics, the “Stop Snitchin’” campaign 
has been fed by a DVD entitled “Stop Fucking Snitchin’,” and a clothing 
line of t-shirts and apparel using that phrase as its logo, as well as a fol-
low-up DVD, “Stop Snitchin’ 2.”551 The DVDs discuss threats and vio-
lence against witnesses, together with footage of people discussing their 
desire to kill those who “rat.”552 In Newark, New Jersey, T-shirts carry 
pictures of witnesses that are to be killed, and pilfered witness statements 
are posted online.553 In Baltimore and Boston, rap artists tell residents 
not to cooperate with the local authorities.554 Sports stars also give legiti-
macy to the message. When asked how many pro athletes from high-
crime areas would help identify criminals, Baltimore native and NBA 
veteran Sam Cassell said, “‘One hundred percent of them would say no. 
                                                                                                                                      
 548. See supra text and authorities accompanying note 542. 
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A hundred. If I see five guys doing something [illegal] on the street, I’m 
going to look the other way and hope I don’t see no more.’”555 
The norm against snitching has taken hold on the streets of many 
U.S. cities, including Newark, Baltimore, Philadelphia, Dallas, and 
Washington DC, and affects all demographics:556  
The Stop Snitching movement has found its tipping point—and is 
now infectiously sweeping through the public . . . . This code is be-
ing adhered to not only by prisoners, but also by thirteen-year-old 
girls in school, middle-aged neighbors across the street, and ordi-
nary citizens who would rather run away from the police instead of 
to them.557 
In 2005, a witness to a murder was attacked while in protective custody.558 
Summoned to the door of his cell, he was seriously burned when sprayed 
by a mixture of water and baby oil that had been heated in a micro-
wave.559 When asked why he had done it, the attacker replied that he had 
heard the person was a snitch.560 
In Essex County (Newark), people willing to help despite the dan-
ger often do so only clandestinely, in some cases leaving notes for detec-
tives in trash cans, or asking to be taken away in handcuffs “so that 
neighbors will think that they’re in trouble with the police and not coop-
erating.”561 Investigators report that when they arrive at a crime scene, it 
is common for bystanders to leave, so as to avoid neighbors thinking that 
they might cooperate with police.562 
Witness intimidation has become so prevalent and expected across 
major cities that a gang leader in prison in New Jersey awaiting trial for 
murder was unconcerned about the existence a potential informant 
against him: even if the informant “take[s] his plea deal . . . [t]hen what? 
What’s he going to do when he gets out? Where’s he going to go where 
no one will be able to find him?”563 
In response to the Stop Snitchin’ norm in Essex County, prosecutors 
have adopted an unwritten policy not to pursue cases in which they have 
a single witness because the person is too likely to be killed or intimidat-
ed into silence.564 Even seemingly “slam-dunk” cases will not be pursued 
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with a single witness, unless the witness’ testimony is extensively corrob-
orated by physical and forensic evidence.565 Although witnesses are con-
sidered particularly compelling at jury trials, the frequency with which 
they are intimidated or killed makes police reluctant to rely on them.566 
Police detectives in Newark and other gang-violence prone areas of New 
Jersey try to avoid using witnesses whenever possible.567 As one state po-
lice detective explained: “[i]f you push someone and they agree to testify, 
now they’re your responsibility . . . [y]ou’ve got to keep them from dis-
appearing or getting hurt. Can we protect them? Maybe. But God forbid 
that two years later you have to tell someone their husband or father got 
killed.”568 Even the then-Governor of New Jersey suggested that police 
should “use civilian witnesses sparingly.”569 While the New Jersey State 
Police gang unit has prosecuted hundreds of cases statewide over the 
past five years, it has used civilian witness testimony less than a dozen 
times in that period.570 
The scary truth appears to be that witness intimidation is a perva-
sive and growing trend in many places.571 A study of witnesses appearing 
in Bronx County, New York, indicated at least thirty-six percent of wit-
nesses had been directly threatened, and that among those not explicitly 
threatened, fifty-seven percent feared that they would be subject to re-
prisals.572 A study conducted by the National Youth Gang Center indi-
cated that eighty-eight percent of urban prosecutors have described wit-
ness intimidation as a serious problem.573 In cities such as Baltimore and 
Boston, prosecutors estimate that witnesses face some kind of intimida-
tion in nearly eighty percent of all homicide cases, while in Essex County, 
New Jersey, prosecutors claim that at least two-thirds of their witnesses 
in homicide cases receive direct threats not to testify.574 It is perhaps no 
surprise that Essex County, with its unspoken rule that single-witness 
homicides generally will not be prosecuted,575 contains one of the most 
dangerous cities in the country: Newark, New Jersey.576 
The success of Stop Snitchin’ only feeds the vicious cycle by making 
effective prosecution of serious crimes more difficult. With the intimida-
tors winning the battle against authorities over public allegiance, or at 
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least compliance, that power only reinforces the impunity with which 
they can intimidate further. That, in turn, gives them a freer hand to 
commit offenses in the first place. In other words, the Stop Snitchin’ re-
sponse is a recipe for disaster for the neighborhood. The lack of coopera-
tion reduces the system’s crime-control effectiveness, which further dam-
ages its reputation, leading to less credibility, and less cooperation, in an 
endless downward spiral. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The current system’s apparent insensitivity to the importance of do-
ing justice may not produce many vigilantes in the streets, but it has con-
tributed to disillusionment about the criminal justice system’s interest in 
doing justice. That disillusionment may help people increasingly justify 
subverting the system. In the spirit of the 1851 Vigilance Committee and 
the Lavender Panthers, the system’s intentional and systemic failures of 
justice provide the shadow vigilantes with moral justification to “take the 
law into to their own hands.” They do this not by taking to the streets—
typically only Hollywood fantasy does that now—but by manipulating 
the system to their own ends as they see others doing to escape deserved 
punishment. 
Such shadow vigilantism may be less dramatic than taking to the 
streets, but it can be pervasive, and ultimately even more damaging to 
the integrity of the process. The 1851 Vigilance Committee announced 
themselves and their doings so people would know their effect. Shadow 
vigilantism provides an unseen and unaccountable corrupting force that 
contaminates the entire process because one can never know when it is at 
work. 
Yet, the criminal justice system currently portrays itself as free to 
create hostility among the community over failures of justice as it sees fit 
because there is nothing a disillusioned community can do about it. This 
is an arrogant and dangerous short game. There is much that a disillu-
sioned and cynical community can do, beyond distracting itself by spend-
ing money to see vigilante hero movies. The community can manipulate 
the system through many avenues to force it to do what it often seems 
reluctant to do. 
The tragedy of this dirty war is twofold. First, it could be avoided 
simply by being more sensitive to the importance of doing justice. The 
system could avoid doctrines that will predictably frustrate justice, unless 
there is a compelling reason to do so and there is no other, less justice-
damaging alterative. Second, forcing the disillusioned into shadow vigi-
lantism often produces results that, in the larger perspective, even the 
shadow vigilantes would find objectionable. Mandatory minimums avoid 
the problem of unchecked lenient sentencing, but they also produce a set 
of cases of predictable injustice. We would all be better off—both the of-
fenders and the community—if the criminal justice system earned some 
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reputation for doing justice without the prodding of an outside force be-
ing necessary. 
Rather than suffer the distortions of shadow vigilantism, it is argued 
here that the system ought to publicly commit itself to the importance of 
doing justice (and of avoiding injustice) in a way that will regain the trust 
of society. That public commitment, backed by action, can undercut the 
motivations for the unfortunate distortions that shadow vigilantism 
brings. It could build trust that the system is devoted to doing justice on 
its own, and need not be manipulated into it. 
No criminal justice system can have a perfect reputation for both 
doing justice and avoiding injustice. Someone will always think the sys-
tem has improperly allowed a clearly guilty offender to go free, even if 
the belief is mistaken. But just as the system ought not give up trying to 
avoid injustice simply because someone will always claim there is more 
to be avoided, neither should the system give up trying to avoid failures 
of justice simply because someone will always claim there are more to be 
avoided. The system can incrementally improve its moral credibility, and 
thereby its crime-control effectiveness, by reducing its current level of 
failures of justice (and of instances of injustice). 
The cure for vigilantism, direct or shadowed, is a clear public com-
mitment to giving the punishment deserved, nothing more and nothing 
less. That will require significant reforms to current rules and practices, 
but such reforms can bring not only greater justice, but also greater sta-
bility, respect, and deference to the criminal law in all its work. 
